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During the Lochner era,1 the Supreme Court often acted as if constitu-
tional adjudication were a process by which it discovered a "natural"
boundary between inherently "public" and "private" spheres.2 This con-
ception of constitutional law has not recovered-and probably never will
recover-from the sustained and devastating assault by the Legal Real-
ists.' Today, few would argue that the boundary between public and pri-
vate is in any way "natural." To the extent that it exists at all, the bound-
ary is a human construct that must be fought for and quarreled over.
Moreover, the widespread interpenetration of activities formerly thought
to be "public" or "private,"4 as well as the growing implausibility of
right-privilege' and malfeasance-nonfeasance distinctions, have made it
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1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. For a survey of the era, see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEiN & M. TUSHNEr, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 739-41 (1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
3. For representative examples of Realist criticism of formalistic reasoning, see K. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 3-18, 393 (1960); Fuller, American Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 435-38 (1934). See generally Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholar-
ship, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1383, 1384-88.
4. See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1294-96 (1984) (questioning distinction between "negative" and "positive"
rights); cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-34 (1934):
But we are told that because the law essays to control prices it denies due process ....
The argument runs that the public control of rates or prices is per se unreasonable and uncon-
stitutional, save as applied to businesses affected with a public interest . . . .[But t]he state-
ment that one has dedicated his property to a public use is. . .merely another way of saying
that if one embarks in a business which public interest demands shall be regulated, he must
know regulation will ensue.
5. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 4, at 1324-26.
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seem increasingly doubtful that the construct has any meaning at all.7
And yet, a half century after the interment of Lochner, the Supreme
Court continues to bound separate public and private spheres. The project
of this Article is to explain this state of affairs. How is constitutional law
possible in a post-Lochner world?
In Section I, I argue that the public/private distinction is best under-
stood in terms of three interlocking dilemmas that are at the heart of mod-
ern political debate. The first dilemma concerns the relationship between
universalist and particularist values. This relationship is problematic: Al-
though most of us are drawn to the universalist ideal of equal, disinter-
ested, and impersonal beneficence toward all members of an expansively
bounded community, we are also attracted to the particularist ideal of self-
regard and caring, intimate relationships premised on preferences for par-
ticular members of that community.
The second dilemma concerns the relationship between government in-
tervention and libertarianism. This relationship is also problematic: Al-
though we want a government powerful enough to protect individual au-
tonomy from nongovernment coercion, we also fear that such a
government would be powerful enough to destroy the autonomy it is
designed to protect.
The third dilemma concerns the relationship between openness and se-
crecy. Here the problem is that although information is a necessary predi-
cate for autonomous decisionmaking, we sometimes use that autonomy to
keep secret intimate details of our private lives.
My aim is not to offer a theory to resolve these three dilemmas. On the
contrary, I argue that the nature of these contradictory impulses makes
constitutional law necessary. Instead of offering reconciliation, constitu-
tional law allows us to live with contradiction by establishing a shifting,
uncertain, and contested boundary between distinct public and private
spheres within which conflicting values can be separately nurtured.
Such a boundary is necessary because of the tendency of each sphere to
engulf the other. On the one hand, there is constant risk that the public
sphere will be co-opted by egocentric individuals who advance particular-
ist values. These efforts must be resisted in order to preserve unifying
institutions that foster widespread allegiance and act for the public good.
Part of that resistance consists of efforts to keep government institutions
sufficiently open to detect and check efforts of capture by narrowly-based
factions.
On the other hand, some limits must be set on the jurisdiction of a
7. See Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349 (1982).
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government kept truly free of private domination. There must be an en-
forceable boundary between government and nongovernment spheres so
that individuals have space to develop the particularist side of their per-
sonalities. Just as openness protects the universalist orientation of govern-
ment, privacy-in the sense of secrecy-protects a particularist sphere by
shielding particularist decisions from what could otherwise be destructive
criticism from universalist institutions.
The remainder of my argument concerns the special role of judicial
review in enforcing the boundary between public and private. Section II
argues that most modern theories of judicial review have failed to cope
with Legal Realism's legacy. This difficulty stems from a tension in the
utilitarian theory that lies at the root of much post-Realist analysis. On
the one hand, utilitarianism's bias in favor of universalist values presses
us toward an equal regard for the welfare of everyone.8 On the other
hand, its refusal to make normative judgments concerning tastes and pref-
erences argues against the kind of judicial review that would be necessary
to vindicate such equality. The result is a persistent divergence between
promise and performance: Whereas many modern constitutional theories
seem to argue for vigorous judicial action to promote openness and gov-
ernment protection for universalist values, the Court has opted instead for
a form of constitutional review that checks government, and thereby pro-
tects a system of exclusive "private" nongovernment institutions blocking
equal access to goods and power.
Section III suggests some ways in which these difficulties might be
overcome by understanding the interrelationships of the three dilemmas
outlined above. The work of judges can be understood as an effort to ma-
nipulate decisionmaking contexts through, for example, insistence on va-
rying degrees of openness and secrecy, or government interventionism and
libertarianism, so as to preserve continuing, unresolved tensions between
our universalist and particularist urges. Judges can be seen as specially
equipped to perform this role because of existing institutional arrange-
ments that encourage their mixed allegiance to both universalism and
particularism.
To avoid misunderstanding, I want to make clear that this theory of
judicial review is not normative, at least not in the usual sense. It is not
my intention to advance an argument that requires or compels the reader
to accept the legitimacy of modern constitutional review. As Robert
Nozick has pointed out, "trying to get someone to believe something
8. This is not to say that all forms of utilitarianism necessarily require equality of outcomes. In
some versions of the theory, the very requirement of equal counting of utilities leads to distributions
strongly favoring those who can make best use of the resource in question. The theory is nonetheless
egalitarian in the sense that it takes as its initial premise the necessity of an equal counting of utilities.
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whether he wants to believe it or not, is not . . . a nice way to behave
toward someone."" Rather, my argument is advanced in the spirit of
Nozick's effort to show how certain beliefs are possible.10 Only after ex-
ploring the best possible reasons why one might want to believe in consti-
tutional review as practiced in this country can we talk about whether one
would want to hold such a belief.
In Section IV, I offer tentative thoughts about why one might, or might
not, find such a belief attractive. I argue that a boundary maintenance
theory resolves some of the anomalies discussed in Section II and assists in
understanding some otherwise incomprehensible forms of judicial inter-
vention. But it also creates new problems-problems that are likely to
make advocates of the theory uneasy. These problems in turn raise
broader questions concerning the limits on what we can realistically ex-
pect from a theory of constitutional law.
I. PUBLIC PRINCIPLE AND PRIVATE CHOICE
At some point during the first third of this century our political dis-
course about constitutional rights got seriously out of whack. The emer-
gence of this difficulty coincided with the development of a schism in
classical liberalism, a schism that tracks the interventionist versus liberta-
rian dilemma.1"
Liberal thought is characterized in part by the importance it attaches to
the individual's autonomy in pursuing her own conception of the good.1"
The schism concerns the relationship between the performance of govern-
ment and the protection of autonomy. Libertarians associate autonomy
with the absence of governmental coercion. Those suspicious of govern-
ment define autonomy as the ability of individuals to participate in "free"
markets unfettered by government control."3 Any inequalities that result
from these market transactions are considered just because they emerge
from a just process.14
In contrast, interventionists see vigorous government redistribution as a
precondition to real freedom. Inequalities in the distribution of power and
9. R. NoZICK, PHII.OSOPHICAI. EXPI.ANATIONS 13 (1981).
10. See id. at 8-24.
11. See, e.g., H. LASKI, THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM 6-13 (1940); T. NEILL, THE RISE AND
DECt.INE OF LIBERAI.SM 13-32 (1953). Critics of liberal democracy have argued that the schism
reflects the internal contradictions in any theory that is both liberal and democratic. See, e.g., A.
LEVINE, LIBERAi. D.M(X:RA(CY (1981).
12. See, e.g., G. MORt.AN, AMERICA'S HERITAGE FROM JOHN STUART MILL 30-36 (1936);
Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127-36 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
13. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSriTrrtoN OF LIBERTY (1960); R. NoziCK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
14. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUsTIcE 60-87 (1981); cf R. NoziCK, supra note
13, at 161-64.
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resources between competing nongovernment groups make the "freedom"
to participate in markets to some extent illusory.15 Only through a pro-
gram of collective action can nongovernment coercion be restrained and
genuine autonomy guaranteed.
Both of these views are problematic and limited. It would be a serious
mistake to suppose that they are the only poles around which our political
debate could be organized. It would also be a mistake to suppose that
many politicians adhere with unwavering consistency to one view or the
other. But both views are coherent ways of looking at the world, and they
serve as a useful, if overly simple, means of modeling and understanding
modern political dialogue. Unfortunately, however, it has proven ex-
tremely difficult to translate either view into a coherent constitutional
theory.
A. Interventionist Theory
It is possible to imagine an interventionist theory of constitutional
rights. The government would have a constitutional obligation systemati-
cally to correct deficiencies in allocations of goods and power produced by
the private sector. This view might be coupled with an activist theory of
judicial review under which the Court would insist on government inter-
vention whenever the political branches default in their obligation to regu-
late private power.16 In general, however, the interventionist theory has
not prevailed.1 7 Instead, the Court has identified constitutional law with
15. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SocIAL JUSTICE IN rHE LIBERAl. STrTE 261-72 (1980).
16. For some efforts to demonstrate that an interventionist theory is possible, see P. Edelman, A
Judicially Declared Right to a Minimum "Survival" Income-An Idea Whose Time May Yet Come
(rev. ed. Sept. 1986) (unpublished manuscript); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional De-
mocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Tushnet, Dia-Tribe (Book Review), 78 MICH. L. RFv. 694,
696-701 (1980).
17. This is not to deny the existence of an alternative tradition in American constitutional law.
Justice Black spoke for this view in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), when he wrote that the
state has an affirmative obligation to prevent private corporations from interfering with freedom of
speech:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to
enjoy freedom of press and religion, . . we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a
preferred position. . . .In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises
where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public,
is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens
so as to restrict their fundamental liberties ....
Id. at 509 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Court's preoccupation with the effect of school segregation
on the "hearts and minds" of black children in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954),
can be understood as rooted in an affirmative government obligation to arrange its institutions so as to
prevent the perpetuation of entrenched hierarchies. See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 5 J. PHin & PuB. AFF. 107 (1976). As the Court noted in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
218-19 (1982) (footnotes omitted):
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country ... has
resulted in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of illegal migrants-numbering
in the millions-within our borders. This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of
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the task of defining private spheres within which individuals must be left
free from government interference."'
Two hypothetical cases illustrate the problems this orientation poses for
certain strands of modern constitutional scholarship. In the first case, a
married couple engages in some form of "nonstandard" sexual activity in
the privacy of their own bedroom. In the second case, the couple engages
in precisely the same activity in the presence of a film crew that records
the event for distribution to local movie houses. For present purposes,
there is no need to determine whether the state could interfere with either
or both of these activities.19 What is significant is that the couple's claim
to constitutional protection in the first case would almost certainly be
stronger than the claim in the second case.20 This difference stems from
the fact that the first couple has kept its conduct within a private sphere
in a way that the second has not. The first couple could therefore rely on
such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut 1  and Stanley v. Georgia,2 2 in
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor,
but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful
residents. The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation
that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
In general, however, this alternative tradition has been subordinated. Compare, e.g., Marsh and
Brown with Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (employees asserting unconstitutional dis-
charge did not state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 merely because employer supported by public
funds) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (showing of racially disproportionate impact
alone is insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny under equal protection or due process clause). For a
discussion of the confusion that is generated when the two traditions clash, see CONSITrUTIONAL.
LAW, supra note 2, at 575-78.
18. The modern "state action" doctrine, for example, rests on the premise that people are "free"
as long as the government remains passive. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
936-37 (1982):
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. . . . A major consequence is to
require the courts to respect the limits of their own power as directed against . . . private
interests. Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order.
The unthinking equation of "individual freedom" with limitations on the reach of federal law would
be quite congenial to adherents of laissez-faire capitalism. Of course, the architects of Reconstruction
and of the New Deal had a different idea. Only a Court profoundly committed to a libertarian version
of autonomy could accept the equation as a "fundamental fact of our political order." Id. at 937.
19. Although the Court has upheld application of a sodomy statute to voluntary, private homosex-
ual acts, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), it pointedly distinguished its prior cases con-
cerning state regulation of incidents of the marriage relationship, id. at 2843-44, and did not consider
constitutional questions posed by criminalization of nonhomosexual sodomy. Id. at 2842 n.2.
20. In Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), for example, the court rejected a
constitutional attack on the sodomy conviction of a married couple" because they had arranged to
photograph their sexual activity.
The existence of seclusion in a sexual act . . . is a necessary prerequisite to that act's being
protected from state regulation by the Constitution. Where that element has been relinquished
by the parties in the performance of their sexual act, they have given up the Constitution's
protection over the manner in which they choose to carry out that act.
Id. at 626; see also Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing constitution-
ally significant distinction between "laws that protect public sensibilities and those that enforce private
morality").
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
1011
The Yale Law Journal
which constitutional protection was premised on the nonpublic nature of
the activity. 3 In Griswold, the Court thought that sexual relations inci-
dent to marriage deserved special constitutional protection because mar-
riage is "an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects."'2 4 And in Stanley, the Court struck down the state's effort to
regulate the private use of pornography because the state was unable to
demonstrate that the conduct in question had any public effect: "Whatever
the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to
the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the
desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.12 5
For adherents to the currently dominant branches of constitutional the-
ory, these results must seem incomprehensible. First Amendment theory
suggests that communication is worthy of special protection precisely be-
cause it deals with "causes," "political faiths," and "commercial or social
projects." Speech is said to "check" government, 26 or to unblock the chan-
nels of change,27 or to be essential to the processes of self-government,28 or
even to epitomize the fundamental human desire to interrelate with other
members of the species.29 Could the commentators espousing these views
possibly be describing the same First Amendment that, the Supreme
Court tells us, protects Stanley in his lonely, apolitical, masturbatory
fantasies?3"
23. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-22 (1984) (organization lacked dis-
tinctive characteristics of smallness or selectivity that might have afforded constitutional protection to
its decision to exclude women).
24. 381 U.S. at 486.
25. 394 U.S. at 566.
26. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RFS. J.
521.
27. See, e.g., J. Es.y, DEMOCRACY AND Di.sus'r 105-34 (1980).
28. See A. MEIKI.. OHN, Po.rrlCAL. FREEDOM: THE CONSrirrrTIONAl. POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1965); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1965).
29. See I. BERLIN, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in FOUR ESsAYS ON LIBEwrvy 173
(1969).
30. The tension between Stanley and conventional First Amendment theory recently surfaced in
the Court's treatment of the case in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Hardwick relied on
Stanley to support his claim that the state could not constitutionally punish voluntary acts of sodomy
performed in his own home. Although the Court acknowledged that Stanley protected conduct that
would not have been protected outside the home, it sought to distinguish the case on the ground that
Stanley "was firmly grounded in the First Amendment." Id. at 2846. But the Court has never articu-
lated a theory of the First Amendment that would accord more protection to conduct precisely because
it was undertaken in an environment that minimized the possibility of communication with others.
Griswold, unlike Stanley, does not purport to rest on a First Amendment rationale. But it again
seems paradoxical that the married couple in Griswold was entitled to more protection because they
were not engaged in the kind of public communication ordinarily shielded by the First Amendment.
The Griswold Court seems to have been aware of this problem. As originally drafted, Justice Doug-
las's opinion relied expressly on the First Amendment. Douglas argued that the Connecticut anti-
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Broader constitutional theories do not clarify matters. Many of these
theories are preoccupied with fostering universalist values. For example,
pluralist theories tell us that judicial intervention is necessary to compen-
sate for the effective exclusion of certain groups from the political process.
Adherents to these theories argue that the inability of some minorities to
form coalitions with other groups prevents political institutions from prop-
erly aggregating individual preferences. The exclusion of these groups
means that our government institutions do not truly represent the public
interest."1
In recent years, there has been a backlash against pluralist constitu-
contraception statute violated freedom of association by interfering with the marriage relationship,
which "flourishes on the interchange of ideas." B. SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE
WARREN COURT 235 (1985). When Douglas first unveiled this theory at conference, it elicited a
biting rejoinder from Justice Black, a Griswold dissenter: "[The right of association is for me [a]
right of assembly [and the right] of [a] husband [and] wife to assemble in bed is [a] new right of
assembly to me." Id. at 237. Even Justice Brennan, a member of the Griswold majority, was unper-
suaded by the First Amendment rationale. He wrote Douglas that the "association" of married
couples had little to do with the public advocacy protected by the freedom of assembly clause. Id.
Ultimately, Douglas was persuaded to abandon his "interchange of ideas" rationale in favor of an
approach based on personal privacy. Id. at 238.
31. In its simplest form, pluralism suggests that outcomes of the political process necessarily re-
flect the public interest. This theory assumes that the public interest consists of nothing more than the
fair aggregation of private preferences and that the political process provides a method of fair aggrega-
tion. See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98Q.J. ECoN. 371 (1983). This view supports positivist constitutional theories that treat the Constitu-
tion as embodied in whatever outcomes the political process produces. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NAIIONAt. PoIrrTcAL PROCESS 29-45 (1980); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Cot.um. L. REv. 543 (1954). See generally Parker, The Past of Constitutional The-
ory-and Its Future, 42 OHIO Sr. L.J. 223, 224-29 (1981). The theory is usually taken to imply a
passive judicial stance, see, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra, at 171-379, although it remains far from clear
why an activist Court should be excluded from the embodied constitutional order. See Spann, Hyper-
space (Book Review), 84 MICH. L. REV. 628, 638 (1986). This version of pluralism currently domi-
nates the Court's approach to federalism and to "social and economic" legislation. See, e.g., Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166 (1980).
Pluralists who favor some form of judicial activism have generally pointed to a defect in the aggre-
gation process to support judicial intervention. The currently dominant version of the theory focuses
on "discrete and insular" minorities precluded by prejudice from entering into coalitions with other
groups. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See generally infra
text accompanying notes 117-48. For the now classic synthesis, see J. ELY, supra note 27. Other
versions of the theory focus on "free rider" problems, which may prevent disorganized and widely
dispersed groups from effective political participation, see, e.g., R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1982); G. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES (19"1); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 724-28 (1985), or on contradictions inherent in any "democratic"
voting procedure, see, e.g., A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
(1980). See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); D.
MUEI.ER, PUB.IC CHOICE (1979).
Pluralists with an interventionist bias have used the "defect" approach to support selective judicial
action to "cleanse" the political process by protecting powerless minorities from hostile legislation. See
generally Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287
(1982). Libertarian versions of the theory use some of the same observations to argue for market
allocations. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrrIUTION 318-31 (1980).
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tional theory. But ironically, the critique asserts that pluralist theory is
insufficiently universalist. Nonpluralists assert that the public interest is
more than the simple aggregation of private preferences. Indeed, legisla-
tion that reflects no more than private preferences-"special interest legis-
lation"-should be unconstitutional. The Constitution fosters a public di-
alogue in which citizens, motivated by civic virtue, transcend narrow
private interests and take their public responsibilities seriously.32 Judicial
review should promote this dialogue by reminding us of values formulated
during those occasional dramatic points in our history when public politics
were all-consuming.33
Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to all of this, the Supreme Court con-
tinues to protect a nongovernmental sphere precisely because this sphere is
thought to develop the particularist ideals of intimacy and special caring.34
Decisions regarding child rearing,35 procreation,36 religious practice,37 and
family organization" have all been held to be within this nongovernmen-
tal sphere.
It is important to understand, however, that equal protection and free
speech jurisprudence, which one might think is more amenable to analysis
in terms of pluralist or public interest models, also are examples of the
Court's insistence on protection of nongovernmental power. With only
rare exceptions, 9 the Court has not read the equal protection clause to
32. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 31, at 713; Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really
Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CRFI;HTON L. R:v. 487 (1979); Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. RF-v. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Interest Groups]; Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COi.UM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Naked Preferences].
33. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YAt.LE L.J. 1013,
1049-52 (1984) (lessons from founding of nation, Civil War, and New Deal "control the meanings
we give to our present constitutional predicaments").
34. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984) (citations omitted):
[Cihoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme....
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of constitu-
tional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role
in the culture and traditions of the Nation by transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State .... Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realiza-
tion that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the
ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.
35. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
37. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see
also supra note 17 (discussing governmental intervention in equal protection cases).
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mandate government intervention to counterbalance nongovernmental ar-
rangements that disadvantage minorities.4 The requirement of equal pro-
tection has instead been read almost exclusively as a limit on government
intervention. Similarly, the First Amendment, in the Court's view, pre-
vents, rather than requires, government regulation of the media even
when the regulation is intended to insure that all views in fact compete
equally in the free market of ideas."1 Indeed, most modern constitutional
law can be reduced to a series of rules prohibiting government interfer-
ence with nongovernmental power centers. A wide variety of nongovern-
mental institutions-newspapers,"2 corporations, 43 families,44 churches,45
and medical organizations, 40 to name a few-have benefited from this im-
munity from government regulation exercised in the name of the public
interest. And in the area of criminal procedure, even these organizations
may not be sufficiently individualistic to merit constitutional protection.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments protect only the lone individual barricaded within the confines of
his private dwelling. As soon as he steps out into the world-to form a
business,'47 make a friend,48 or even find a spouse 9-he is said to have
lost his "reasonable expectation of privacy.""
Clearly, then, something is amiss. Whatever the normative merits of
their proposals, many modern constitutional theorists are simply not
describing what is going on.
40. For example, the Court's seminal decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), can
be read as establishing the proposition that the government has no affirmative obligation to counteract
nongovernmental forces that produce outcomes severely disadvantageous to powerless minorities. See
infra text accompanying notes 143-45. Much of the Court's "state action" jurisprudence reflects the
same proposition. See CONSTrtrIrIONAI. LAW, supra note 2, at 1492-94, 1534-36.
41. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
44. See supra notes 35, 38.
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
46. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); cf. Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396-97 (1977) (state regulation that impinges on determination of fetal via-
bility must allow physician leeway to make best medical judgment).
47. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948).
48. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971); cf. United States v. Mat-
lock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
50. See Seidman, ABSCAM and the Constitution, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1199, 1202-03 (1985).
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B. Libertarian Theory
There is a competing tradition in constitutional scholarship which is
devoted to justifying the preservation of a nongovernmental sphere. Ad-
herents to this tradition, although united by opposition to at least certain
forms of government coercion, differ radically in the forms of coercion
they oppose and the reasons for their opposition. One school in this tradi-
tion emphasizes the importance of unfettered participation in private mar-
kets, either because gains from trade in such markets will maximize wel-
fare5" or because participation in such markets is directly equated with
freedom.52 A different school views constitutional analysis as reasoned
elaboration of natural law theory. 5 Since the fundamental purpose of
government is the protection of natural rights, government coercion that
invades these rights is ultra vires.
Whatever the particular permutations of these theories, they have some
significant advantages over the interventionist theories described in the
previous section. In the first place, if the theories are correct, they at least
do the work that is claimed for them; they justify government noninter-
vention in a private sphere. As argued above,54 the same cannot be said
for theories emphasizing public values. Moreover, these libertarian theo-
ries more successfully resolve the anomaly of judicial review than do their
competitors. Public accountability is hardly served by giving more power
to our least publicly accountable institution. But if our aim is the preser-
vation of a private sphere, judicial review makes more sense. 55 Finally,
these theories have undeniable roots in the structure of the Constitution
and eighteenth century political theory from which it emerged. 56
Despite their advantages, however, these theories are unlikely to be at-
tractive for many who remember the lessons of the Lochner era. My in-
tention in what follows is to outline briefly some of the reasons why many
of us find the theories unattractive, so as to lay the groundwork for a
different approach.5 7
Perhaps the most serious deficiency of libertarian theories is the weight
51. See, e.g., R. POSNER, E(:ONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 497-502 (2d ed. 1977).
52. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, supra note 31.
53. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIi.rs SERIousiY 131-49 (1978); M. PERRY, THE CON-
STITUTION, THE COuR'Is, AND HUMAN RGH'rs 97-145 (1982); Richards, Interpretation and Histo-
riography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 490 (1985).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 31-50.
55. By limiting the power of other branches to intervene in the private sphere, courts ensure that
individuals can make some decisions that are not subject to political control. The relative political
insulation of the judges themselves buttresses their ability to perform this function.
56. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 7-18 (1985).
57. What follows is not intended as a thorough critique of the theories, and I do not pretend that
what I have to say about them is either especially original or sufficiently detailed to convert their
adherents.
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they place on our ability to distinguish between government "action" that
interferes with a private sphere and government "inaction" or neutrality
that preserves freedom within that sphere. A familiar illustration is pro-
vided by Miller v. Schoene,58 a decision that in some ways marked the
beginning of the end of the Lochner era. In order to prevent infection of
apple trees by cedar rust (an organism that destroys apple trees but has no
effect on cedars), the state ordered appellants to destroy their cedar trees.
This state "intervention" might have been seen as government "action"
invading the private sphere, and therefore bearing the burden of justifica-
tion. But Justice Stone, writing for the Court, viewed the matter
differently:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever
both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the
less a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by
doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards
within its border to go on unchecked. When forced to such a choice
the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon
the destruction of one class of property in order to save another
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the
public.59
Once the decision to do nothing was, itself, seen as government "action"
for which the government bore responsibility, it became difficult to under-
stand how people could be treated as "free" when coerced by forces in the
private sphere-or, indeed, what made that sphere "private" given the
government's choice to allow the coercion to go unchecked. Far from re-
stricting freedom, government intervention became a necessary predicate
for it. For example, in a later case the court concluded that government
intervention was necessary to end the "exploitation of a class of workers
who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are
thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage."' The gov-
ernment's "action" allowing this exploitation to remain unchecked became
not simply an act of "neutrality," but "what is in effect a subsidy for
unconscionable employers."61
Moreover, even if we ignore the problem of private coercion and accept
the link between government nonintervention and individual rights, we
still face important difficulties in cases where the scope of individual
58. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
59. Id. at 279.
60. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding state law establishing
minimum wage for women against due process clause attack).
61. Id.
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rights is contested. Libertarians value individual freedom and distrust col-
lective decisions. But in the absence of a noncontroversial theory of natu-
ral rights, any resolution of the argument about the appropriate bounda-
ries of a nongovernmental sphere will inevitably involve some form of
collective intervention and coercion directed against people with a compet-
ing theory. Libertarian theories thus constantly teeter on the edge of self-
contradiction. Worse yet, to the extent that libertarians are advocating
constitutional theories, they must explain why conflicts over the content of
natural rights should be resolved by judges, rather than by political insti-
tutions that aggregate all citizens' views on the subject.6 2
Finally, even if collective decisionmaking were avoidable, libertarians
would still need to defend their opposition to such decisionmaking. At this
point, libertarian theories are vulnerable to recent "civic virtue" theories
of constitutional law. 3 These theories challenge the assumption that indi-
vidual choices in private markets are the only forms of autonomous choice.
Individuals are not merely selfish profit maximizers. They also have al-
truistic and collective impulses. Thus, even if individuals act autono-
mously when they participate in private markets, they also act autono-
mously when they participate in collective institutions that limit those
markets. Indeed, our fundamental values can be articulated best when as
public citizens we attempt to define the public interest by participating in
collective institutions. Public and private markets suffer from different
kinds of "market failure," but civic virtue theorists see no inherent reason
to take private markets as the baseline with the burden of proof upon
those who favor collective action. On the contrary, the theory of the Con-
stitution was that the institutions it established would produce public pol-
icy that transcended narrow self-interest. 4
62. Professor Perry's effort to deal with this difficulty ends in a form of contradiction that is
especially instructive. Perry attempts to justify judicial review on the theory that Americans believe in
objectively "right" answers to political-moral questions. M. PERRY, supra note 53, at 102. Political
institutions, he argues, cannot be relied upon to formulate "right" answers because they are likely to
respond by "reflexive reference to the established moral conventions." Id. at 100. Perry must concede
that courts can, and on occasion do, give the wrong "right" answers to moral questions. Id. at 115.
But we need not fear the prospect of unfettered "false prophecy," he tells us, because the courts'
constitutional policymaking "is subject to important control at the hands of electorally accountable
officials" and that "consequently, noninterpretive review operates in a manner . . . that accommo-
dates the principle of electorally accountable policymaking." Id. at 126. But surely it is a mistake to
suppose that we can have it both ways. One cannot simultaneously advocate judicial review on the
ground that it is important to have a system of institutionalized prophecy freed from the constraints of
"established moral conventions" and then defend its legitimacy on the ground that it is subject to those
constraints.
63. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 33; Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145
(1977-1978); Naked Preferences, supra note 32.
64. Much recent scholarship has focused on the role of "civic virtue" and "deliberative politics" in
the anti-federalist critique of the Constitution and in the Federalist response. For useful summaries of
the evidence, see G. Wnt.s, EXPLAININc AMERIC-A 177-264 (1981); Ackerman, supra note 33, at
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C. The Constitution and Private Choice
When the civic virtue critique is coupled with post-Lochner skepticism
about the "natural" private sphere and the government "neutrality" para-
digm, efforts to defend libertarian theories of judicial review appear
doomed. Yet much of the Court's modern work and much of our shared
understanding of what constitutional law is all about are nonetheless pre-
mised on some such theory.65 In this section, I advance an alternative ap-
proach that is at once more plausible in the post-Lochner world than com-
peting libertarian theories and more closely tied to the actual role of
modern constitutional review than interventionist accounts. Briefly stated,
the theory argues that judicial review is necessary to maintain an enforce-
able boundary between spheres, within which we can play out our sepa-
rate and contradictory public and private lives.
Before setting out the theory in greater detail it is necessary to be more
precise concerning the meanings of "public" and "private." The distinc-
tion between the two spheres is associated with three subsidiary distinc-
tions: between universalism and particularism, between interventionism
and libertarianism, and between openness and secrecy. It is striking how
these three seemingly separate distinctions are associated with common
usage of the words "public" and "private." Moreover, the Court seems to
understand, at least on an intuitive level, that the three distinctions are
linked to each other.66 The connections between them are not obvious,
however, and need to be explored in some detail.
1. Universalism Versus Particularism
By universalism, I mean an insistence that we treat all members of an
expansively bounded community with equal concern and respect. Al-
though this requirement is the predicate for virtually all ethical theories, it
is especially important for utilitarianism, which insists that we measure
the rightness of actions or rules on the basis of everyone's utility and
through a system of aggregation that counts utilities of individuals
1017-1031; Interest Groups, supra note 32, at 35-48.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 34-50.
66. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), for example, the Court catalogued
the kinds of activity entitled to "privacy" in the sense of government nonintervention. High on its list
were the "creation and sustenance of a family," id. at 619, which was entitled to protection because it
fostered particularist values: "Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special com-
munity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." Id. at
619-20. Significantly, the Court also associated particularism and nonintervention with secrecy and
exclusiveness in the protected relationship: "Among other things, [relationships protected from govern-
ment intervention] are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectiv-
ity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship." Id. at 620; see also infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
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equally. 7 Both universalism and utilitarianism require us to live our lives
with public regard, in the sense of universal beneficence toward all mem-
bers of the public.
While universalists are surely onto an important truth, it is not the only
truth. One can perhaps see this most clearly by imagining a universalist
saint. As Peter Singer has argued, rigid adherence to universalist values
would require a life devoted to serving others. A perfect universalist
would give away his goods until the point at which their marginal utility
for him would be as great as their marginal utility for another person to
whom the goods might be transferred.' Moreover, a universalist saint
would avoid not only preference for himself, but also any preference for
others that failed to treat the utility of every individual equally. Prefer-
ence for particular friends, family members, fellow citizens, or even,
Singer tells us, fellow homo sapiens would be impermissible.6 9
Such universal beneficence may, in some ways, be an admirable goal.
Given our natural tendency toward selfishness, insistence on the goal may
be utility maximizing. If any of us ever actually achieved the goal, how-
ever, our lives would be fundamentally incomplete. The very factors that
make the saint universalist make his beneficence starkly impersonal and
disembodied.70 Such a saint must care about everyone in the abstract, but
no one in particular, because particular caring would involve unequal
counting of utilities. In short, a universalist saint would be unable to form
a love relationship. He would be an entirely public person. 71
For present purposes, it matters little whether some version of univer-
salism might be able to take account of these objections. Utilitarians, for
67. "Act utilitarians" believe that an act is morally permissible if, but only if, the total expected
utility for everyone affected by it is at least as great as that from any alternative act open to the agent.
See R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 271 (1979). "Rule utilitarians" would
permit performance of an act if, but only if, it is not proscribed by a moral code the currency of which
would produce at least as high an expected utility as the currency of any other moral code. See
Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHIl. RFV. 337, 346 (1969). For an introduction to some
of the complexities of the theory, see D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMIrS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); D.
REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERAION (1980); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
68. See Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIl.. & PUB. AFF. 229 (1972).
69. See Singer, All Animals Are Equal, in ANIMAl. RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 148 (T.
Regan & P. Singer eds. 1976).
70. Herder wrote that
Itlhe savage who loves himself, his wife and his child. . . and works for the good of his tribe
as for his own . . . is in my view more genuine than that human ghost, the . . . citizen of the
world, who, burning with love for all his fellow ghosts, loves a chimera. The savage in his hut
has room for any stranger. . . .The saturated heart of the idle cosmopolitan is a home for no
one.
W. HERDER, IDEAS FOR A PHII.OSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF MANKIND bk. VIII, at 5, quoted in J.
DUNN, WESTERN POI.rTICAI. THEORY IN THE FACE OF THE FrrURE 77 (1979).
71. Nonutilitarians regularly attack utilitarian theory on these grounds. See, e.g., C. FRIED, AN
ANATOMY OF VALUES 207-36 (1970); W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 17-19 (1930).
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example, have devoted great energy and ingenuity to devising modifica-
tions of their theory so as to incorporate the intuition that private lives
and individualized love are important.72 Even most utilitarians have that
intuition, and any political or moral theory must in some way take ac-
count of it. Any theory about what constitutes the good life must recognize
that people are both private and public regarding. We are all equal and
entitled to equality of concern and respect, but we also need lovers, fami-
lies, and friends for whom we care specially. Any effort to resolve this
contradiction is fundamentally misguided. Any resolution would deny an
important aspect of our personalities. We must therefore hold these con-
tradictory impulses in dynamic tension without allowing either to pull us
to one pole or the other.
Two examples, both posing excruciatingly difficult conflicts between
public and private obligations, illustrate the point. Many white liberals
who favor integrated education in theory nevertheless send their own chil-
dren to nearly all-white schools. Opponents of school integration use this
fact with great rhetorical effect to demonstrate the hypocrisy of the liberal
position. But a more charitable explanation is possible. White liberals
who publicly support integration but privately opt for segregation could
be described as demonstrating the inevitable conflict between the universal
and particular parts of their personality.
Similarly, some people who publicly proclaim the absolute sanctity of
human life and the moral impermissibility of killing might nonetheless
take affirmative action to end the hopeless, unbearable suffering of some-
one they loved. There is a line between admirable adherence to principle
and heartless fanaticism, and a person who worries about crossing it un-
dermines neither his public nor private position. Of course, the precise
location of the line can be fairly debated. Not all opponents of euthanasia
who stick to their principles are heartless fanatics. But neither do all those
who waiver from their principles when confronted with hard cases
thereby abandon the moral high ground.
We are likely to attempt to resolve this kind of inconsistency in one of
two ways. Either we condemn the inconsistent behavior as hypocritical
and selfish, or we look for some overarching, reconciling principle that
explains it. Unfortunately, both efforts to domesticate the contradiction
oversimplify the problem.
Sometimes inconsistent behavior involves mere hypocrisy. An individual
72. For efforts by classical utilitarians to deal with the problem, see J. MILL, Utilitarianism, in
THE PHI.OSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MIL. 342-44 (M. Cohen ed. 1961); H. SIDGWICK, THE
METHODS OF ET'HIcs 252 (1907). I argue below that the attempt to offer universalist justifications
for particularist values is fundamentally misguided because, by making the values contingent on satis-
fying universalist criteria, it denies their particularist character. See infra text accompanying notes
82-83.
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who insists that others live by rules he is unwilling to obey is not admira-
ble. Thus, the white liberal who merely pretends to work for policies that
he secretly subverts, and the euthanasia opponent who sanctimoniously
condemns others while hiding her own "murder," deserve nothing but
contempt. But "hypocrisy" does not quite capture the actions of a white
liberal who works hard and in good faith in the political sphere to bring
about results that will make it difficult to vindicate her private prefer-
ences. Nor can an opponent of euthanasia who kills, but then willingly
submits to punishment and publicly acknowledges the wrongfulness of her
own conduct, be summarily dismissed as a hypocrite.
It is similarly reductionist to attempt to reconcile the conflicting posi-
tions. There may be something special about the educational needs of a
particular child or the suffering of a particular terminally ill patient that
justifies an exception to the general rule. Moreover, even if an exception
were not justified, the demands of consistency might force the integration-
ist or the euthanasia opponent to modify either her public or private
stances when confronted with the contradiction between them. But things
do not always work out that way. Some of our preferences are simply
inconsistent and context dependent. Sometimes in a moment of-private cri-
sis we take actions that we authentically regret once our public stance is
restored-but that we would nonetheless take again if returned to the pri-
vate context.
There is a large body of social science evidence demonstrating that peo-
ple often maintain irreducibly contradictory and context dependent prefer-
ences. 73 Moreover, it is possible for people to have second-order prefer-
ences about the appropriate context.7 4 Indeed, were this not true, the very
73. As Arthur Maas pointed out twenty years ago:
Each individual plays a number of roles in his life. . . and each role can lead him to a unique
response to a given choice situation. Thus an individual has the capacity to respond in a given
case, to formulate his preferences, in several ways, including these two: (1) what he believes to
be good for himself-largely his economic self-interest, and (2) what he believes to be good for
the political community ...
[ . . JTihe response that an individual gives in any choice situation will depend in signifi-
cant part on how the question is asked of him, and this means not simply the way a question is
worded, but the total environment in which it is put and discussed.
Maas, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80 Q.J. ECON. 208, 216
(1966). Social scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that people respond differently depending upon
whether they are asked to decide in a collective or individual context. See, e.g., Charters & Newcomb,
Some Attitudinal Effects of Experimentally Increased Salience of a Membership Group, in G. SWAN-
SON, T. NFwCoMB & E. HARTI.EY, READINGS IN SOCIAL. PSYCHOLOGY 415-20 (1958). See gener-
ally Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us, or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental
Law, 12 ENV'r.. LAW. 285, 286-87 & nn. 11-12 (1982).
74. There is a growing literature on the effects of context on preference and the implications these
effects have for the legitimacy of collective choice. See generally Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 729 (1986). For example, people sometimes adapt to their
inability to obtain a good by no longer desiring it. See J. EtsrER, SOUR GRAPFS (1983). Conversely,
it has been shown that people sometimes perceive themselves as more seriously injured when they are
1022
Vol. 96: 1006, 1987
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law
institution of written constitutions would be baffling. Constitutions make
sense only if one assumes that what people prefer when they are thinking
about problems abstractly will differ from what they prefer at a later time
when the problem is real and immediate, and that they have a second-
order preference for an abstract context. 5
It is therefore pointless to demand that people be consistent. We simply
want different things at different times and in different contexts. Most
people value both universal beneficence and particular caring, and a per-
son who is not caught between the irreducibly conflicting demands of
these requirements strikes most of us as incomplete in a fundamental way.
To give up entirely on either universalist principle or particularist choice
is to give up on crucial values.
2. Interventionism Versus Libertarianism
The implications these observations hold for the institutional arrange-
ments we should favor are far from clear. One possible view is that fami-
lies and legislatures, like the individuals who are part of them, should be
in perpetual internal conflict between private and public values. Advocates
of this view argue that it is misleading to suppose that institutions could
ever provide a refuge from the conflict we must always feel between our
public and private selves. Segmenting people's lives into various conflict-
ing roles to be played in different contexts is constricting and unrealistic. 70
Instead of artificially dividing our lives in contradictory ways depending
deprived of something they already have than when they are not given something they want. See, e.g.,
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. 669 (1979). Still other preferences may be a function of the very government policies that
they supposedly justify. See infra text accompanying notes 134-37. On whether second order prefer-
ences can exist, see J. ELsIrFR, U.YssF-s AND "EHE SIRENS (1979) [hereinafter ULYssEs]; Jeffrey,
Preference Among Preferences, 71 J. PHn. 377 (1974); Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-
Command, 60 PuB. IN'ER-S' 94 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Ui.yssFs, supra note 74, at 37. It nonetheless remains unclear why the second-order
preference should be privileged. Since this preference must itself be expressed in either an abstract or
immediate context, it may well be infected by the very contextuality it attempts to transcend. See infra
text accompanying notes 189-90.
76. Marx, for example, appears to have held this view. He thought that mere political emancipa-
tion forced individuals into a
double life, a heavenly and an earthly life, a life in the political community, wherein he counts
as a member of the community, and a life in bourgeois society, wherein he is active as a
private person, regarding other men as a means, degrading himself into a means and becoming
a plaything of alien powers.
K. MARX, On the Jewish Question, in SE.LEcrED ESSAYS 55-56 (H. Stenning trans. 1926). Authentic
human emancipation could only be achieved when
individual man is identical with the citizen, and has become a generic being in his empirical
life, in his individual work, in his individual relationships, [when] man has recognized and
organized his own capacities as social capacities, and consequently the social force is no longer
divided by the political power . ...
Id. at 84-85.
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on the context in which we act, we need to integrate them by bringing to
bear our conflicting intuitions on every decision we make."'
There is surely some force to this position. It may be true, for example,
that our public and private decisions need to be informed by insights de-
rived when we act in the opposite sphere. Opponents of school segregation
and euthanasia may not be able to advance their public positions with
quite the same fervor if they remain in touch with their private personali-
ties. Perhaps it is also possible and desirable to lead a fully integrated life
while simultaneously entertaining contradictory views about the world. If
so, then I cannot see an argument for constitutional arrangements, en-
forced by judicial review, designed to maintain separate public and private
spheres.
It seems to me at least plausible, however, that this sort of complete
integration is neither possible nor desirable-or, in any event, that even if
it were possible and desirable in theory, it would be extremely difficult for
many people in our culture to achieve it in practice.7 '8 A whole person
needs to develop both the universalist and particularist sides of her per-
sonality and needs to understand that these impulses contradict each other.
But at any particular moment a person must stand somewhere. She can-
not simultaneously be both for and against school segregation.
As the euthanasia and segregation examples suggest, people in our cul-
ture often attempt to soften this contradiction by operating in different
contexts within which particularist and universalist impulses can be nur-
tured.7 '9 Of course, even if people do require separate spheres to play out
the particularist and universalist aspects of their personalities, it does not
77. Passages in the work of Roberto Unger suggest that he holds this view. Unger rejects the idea
that the contradictions between the particular and universal which are central to liberal thought can
be denied or overcome. "[The outright denial of the differences that liberalism turns into oppositions
would fail to account for some crucial aspect of our experience of what the world is like, or of our
intentions as moral beings." R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POMIT'S 139 (1975). Even in a commu-
nity "held together by an allegiance to common purposes," this conflict cannot be transcended. Id. at
220. "The experiences of immanent order and of transcendence can never be wholly reconciled as long
as man retains the gift of consciousness. No one can ever love everyone else as concrete individuals;
nor can he lose all sense of his isolation from them without sacrificing individual identity." Id. at 260.
But although this ideal is not achievable, it does not follow for Unger that it is right to avoid ap-
proaching the ideal by taking refuge in separate roles or spheres. Thus, his theory of community
tries . . . to determine what sympathetic social relations would look like and thus to describe
the political equivalent of love. Two factors coalesce in sympathy: the communion of purposes
by virtue of which each views the other as a complementary rather than as an antagonistic
will, and the willingness to see and treat others as concrete individuals rather than as role
occupants.
Id. at 261; see also Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 825-27 (1983) (communities of understanding "painstak-
ingly created by people who enter into certain kinds of relations and share certain kinds of
experiences").
78. Unger posits political arrangements radically different from those existing today as a prereq-
uisite to the creation of "sympathetic" social relations. R. UNGER, supra note 77, at 252, 262-67.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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automatically follow that these spheres should correspond to the dividing
line between government and nongovernment institutions. In particular,
there is nothing wrong with an individual, or with nongovernment institu-
tions, that are sometimes influenced by universalist impulses. Moreover, it
is almost certainly simplistic to suppose that the conflict between univer-
salism and particularism can be captured by a dichotomous division. We
operate in a range of contexts within which ever widening groupings
claim our attention-from self, to family, to community and nation, to
species and beyond.
Although it is wrong to assume that personal, private decisions are nec-
essarily particularist, there is an association between representative gov-
ernment and universalism. For example, there is a close link between the
utilitarian insistence on equally weighing of utilities and political theories
that require government institutions to equally aggregate preferences.
True, even a government that exhibits equal concern and respect for all its
citizens is to some degree particularist. No matter how inclusively we de-
fine the community, the line must always be drawn somewhere. Thus, our
current government does not exhibit the same concern for Mexicans that
it does for its own citizens-and, even if it did, the problems posed by the
welfare of future generations, of animals, and ultimately, I suppose, of
plants and rocks would loom.
No government can be perfectly universalist, but the ideal of public
citizenship, of political office open to all, and of public institutions equally
responsive to the welfare of each member of the community, pushes us
toward the universalist end of the continuum. As civic virtue theorists
have persuasively argued, government institutions provide a context for
people to view problems from a broader "public interest" rather than a
narrower selfish or chauvinistic perspective.80 If universalist values are at-
tractive, then it makes sense for people to precommit themselves, through
constitutional provisions, to the preservation of a government sphere that
encourages choices based on those values.
Paradoxically, this association between government and universalism
also provides a double-barreled argument for nonintervention. One half of
the argument has already been advanced by the pluralist and civic virtue
models of constitutional review. According to these views, when govern-
ment decisions are not fully public-either because certain groups are ex-
cluded from the political process, or because government institutions have
been captured by special interests intent upon effecting a naked wealth
80. See supra notes 32, 63; see also Sax, The Legitimacy of Collective Values: The Case of the
Public Lands, 56 U. Com.o. L. R-v. 537 (1985) (decisionmaking apparatus of state is only means for
expression of civic values).
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transfer unjustified by public purpose-government intervention is
unconstitutional."1
Alone, however, pluralist and civic virtue theories fail to explain why
there should be constitutional limits on intervention by a fully public gov-
ernment or why, indeed, the Constitution should not be read to mandate
such intervention. The second half of the argument, which these theories
overlook, is premised on the desirability of maintaining particularist val-
ues. Precisely because government intervention must keep a universalist
orientation, some limit on that intervention is necessary. The point is not
that individuals operating in the private sphere necessarily will, or should,
be uninfluenced by universalist concerns. It is, rather, that pervasive, uni-
versalist government intervention would allow no space for particularist
choice. Thus, the ideal of a "public" government necessarily entails its
opposite: a "private" sphere, protected from public intervention, within
which people are free to form individualized relationships that cannot be
justified under the requirements of impersonal beneficence.
3. Openness Versus Privacy
For post-Lochner generations skeptical of "natural" limits on govern-
ment intervention, the concept of separate government and non-
government spheres is profoundly problematic. As argued above, 2 the
government's toleration of a non-government sphere is, itself, government
action with predictible consequences for which the government is respon-
sible. There is, therefore, a serious risk of self-contradiction: If all govern-
ment decisions must be justified under universalist criteria, then the gov-
ernment's toleration of a particularist sphere must be defended on
universalist terms. But this insistence that particularist decisions be justi-
fied under universalist criteria negates their particularist character, which
destroys the very values we purport to preserve.
To avoid this self-contradiction, libertarian theories must reestablish the
distinction between "action" attributable to the government, which must
therefore be judged by universalist norms, and "inaction" leaving un-
touched private decisions for which the government bears no responsibil-
ity, and which may therefore be based upon particularist norms. In a
post-Lochner world without natural boundaries, this distinction can only
be maintained by a precommitment that defines the contexts in which gov-
ernment "action" and "inaction" occur.
In his work on precommitment and imperfect rationality, 3 Jon Elster
81. See supra notes 31-32.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
83. Ui.ysss, supra note 74.
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suggests some forms this precommitment might take. Elster explores Pas-
cal's famous "wager argument" for belief in God:"' If there is some possi-
bility that God exists and if a person believing in God receives a large
payoff if he is right, then a person intent on maximizing utility would so
believe. As Pascal understood, however, the efficacy of a belief can never
by itself provide reasons for adopting that belief. A person wishing to pur-
sue this strategy must therefore precommit to undertaking a course of ac-
tion whereby she will come to have utility maximizing beliefs for nonutil-
ity maximizing reasons. Since she cannot both believe that something is
true, and also believe that that belief stems solely from a decision to be-
lieve that it is true whether or not it actually is, a successful precommit-
ment strategy requires binding herself in a manner that induces forgetful-
ness about the source of the belief.
Something like this strategy is at work in the maintenance of separate
government and nongovernmental spheres.. By manipulating the amount
of information available-by creating in advance the correct mix of open-
ness and secrecy-we can both precommit to separate particularist and
universalist decision criteria and hide the particularist or universalist mo-
tive for the precommitment.
It is thus no coincidence that a variety of legal doctrines associate se-
crecy and exclusivity with a particularist, nongovernmental sphere or that
the word "privacy" has a double connotation, suggesting both the absence
of information and the absence of government. The Court has gone to
extraordinary lengths to protect particularist, nongovernmental decisions
from the glare of publicity. The right of a woman to secrecy in electing
between childbirth and abortion, 5 the whole structure of Fourth Amend-
ment law protecting home and family from public intrusion, 6 and our
84. The discussion that follows is drawn from id. at 47-57.
85. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169
(1986), for example, the Court explicitly linked government nonintervention designed to assure vindi-
cation of particularist values in the abortion decision to secrecy designed to shield that decision from
universalist criticism. Thus, a woman's decision whether to have an abortion is immune from govern-
ment interference because:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government. That
promise extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate,
more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's
decision . . . whether to end her pregnancy.
Id. at 2184-85 (citations omitted). Having established the particularist nature of the decision, the
Court found that a precommitment to secrecy was necessary to shield this decision from universalist
criticism:
The decision to terminate a pregnancy is an intensely private one that must be protected in a
way that assures anonymity. . ..
A woman and her physician will necessarily be more reluctant to choose an abortion if there
exists a possibility that her decision and her identity will become known publicly.
Id. at 2181-82.
86. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
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insistence on making a range of "tragic choices"-which are almost al-
ways particularist in character-through low-visibility mechanisms that
maximize discretion and minimize the application of general standards 87
provide but a few examples.8 8 Through a precommitment to a kind of
ignorance, universalist institutions are able to wall themselves off from the
consequences of inaction, thereby preserving a particularist sphere without
having to offer a universalist justification for particularism.
Conversely, when a nongovernment actor publicizes a particularist deci-
sion, we are no longer able to "forget" the consequences of government
inaction, and the actor therefore may be taken to have submitted herself to
universalist jurisdiction. Thus, businesses that open themselves to the pub-
lic are sometimes treated as government entities subject to universalist
constraints for constitutional purposes,89 and individuals who act in public
The [homosexual sodomy] for which Hardwick faces prosecution occurred in his own home,
a place to which the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance.
Id. at 2852.
Statutes banning public sexual activity are entirely consistent with protecting the individual's
liberty interest in decisions concerning sexual relations: the same recognition that those deci-
sions are intensely private which justifies protecting them from governmental interference can
justify protecting individuals from unwilling exposure to the sexual activities of others. But the
mere fact that intimate behavior may be punished when it takes place in public cannot dictate
how States can regulate intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places.
Id. at 2855.
87. Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt have noted the tendency of our society to relegate "tragic
choices" to juries or "aresponsible" agencies that are decentralized, exercise wide discretion, make no
precedent, and follow few rules. G. CAI.ABRFS1 & P. Boasri-r, TRAGIC CHocEs 57-72 (1978). One
characteristic of such decisionmakers is that their procedures tend to shield them from universalist
criticism, and it seems plausible that we therefore adopt such procedures in those cases where we
value particularist allocations.
88. Ironically, secrecy also may be required to maintain the nongovernmental status of groups
that contribute to the universalist quality of government institutions. In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), for example, the Court identified two distinct lines of authority protect-
ing the right of association. One group of cases, granting to "highly personal relationships a substan-
tial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State," id. at 618, is preoccupied with
the protection of particularist values. But a second group of cases cannot be explained on this ration-
ale. The Court has "long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the
First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of politi-
cal, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Id. at 622. Here, government inter-
vention threatens not the particularist nature of the private sphere, but the universalist nature of the
government sphere. If such nongovernmental political organizations were not shielded from govern-
ment control, the current balance of forces within government would simply replicate itself within the
groups trying to influence government, thereby freezing the status quo and preventing government
from being fully representative. Consequently, it is necessary to create space between state and polit-
ics. See Cover, supra note 31, at 1311. Not surprisingly, one means of maintaining this space is a
precommitment to a measure of secrecy regarding nongovernmental political organizations. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (state cannot constitutionally
compel Socialist Workers Party to report names of contributors and campaign workers); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (court may not require NAACP to provide member-
ship list).
89. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 314
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (private property used in a manner of public consequence impli-
cates public interest); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (public use of property requires
limiting owner's rights so as to protect rights of users). On other occasions, the Court has treated the
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ways are said to "waive" their Fourth Amendment rights and "reasonable
expectation of privacy."' 0
Just as a precommitment to secrecy protects particularism, so a precom-
mitment to publicity protects universalism. A highly visible decisionmak-
ing process is more likely to be criticized by all affected groups than a less
visible process. The more visible decisionmaker is accordingly more likely
to consider these criticisms. Visibility also promotes a public dialogue in
which people think as public citizens and so transcend, to some extent,
particularist concerns. Theories of the First Amendment that emphasize
the "checking" function of the press,"' as well as "structural due process"
theories that require legislatures to consider various options and candidly
commit themselves to the reasons for their decisions," are based on some
such notion.
In summary, the universalist dilemma, the interventionist dilemma, and
the openness dilemma are interconnected. If we are to have a universalist
government that accords all members of the community equal concern and
respect, then limits must be placed on interventionism in order to allow
space for particularist decisions. And if we are to avoid the contradiction
inherent in providing universalist justifications for particularist decisions,
then we must pre-establish mechanisms assuring secrecy for particularist
decisions, so that the government can "forget" the particularist conse-
quences of its inaction.
II. INTERVENTIONISM, SKEPTICISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
The theory set out above implies the need for a constitutional guarantee
of separate public and private spheres. By itself, however, it provides no
basis for insisting on the special competence of judges to articulate consti-
tutional values. Historically, many efforts to justify such a role for judges
have foundered on the difficulty of providing a principled defense for any
absence of exclusivity as a justification for legislative universalist intervention. See, e.g., Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1984); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1973) (non-exclusive operation of community swimming pool violates anti-
discrimination statute by excluding blacks).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
91. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The Court held:
"[T]hroughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe." Id. at 564. "[Open-
ness provided] assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discour-
aged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality." Id. at
569. "In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read
as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees."
Id. at 575.
92. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244-45 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Court
should be skeptical of legislative justifications created after the fact); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 553 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Congress should state reasons for class-based statutes).
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particular boundary between public and private.93 In this Section, I sug-
gest some reasons why conventional efforts to deal with this problem seem
so unsatisfying. The next Section offers an alternative approach that side-
steps the problem of principle.
A. Justice Holmes and the Source of the Difficulty
One can trace the intellectual origins of contemporary confusion con-
cerning judicial review to two brief dissenting opinions written by Justice
Holmes when the schism in classical liberalism was first becoming appar-
ent. In Lochner v. New York,94 Holmes objected to the Court's use of
substantive due process to invalidate New York's maximum hours legisla-
tion for bakers. Fourteen years later, in Abrams v. United States,95 he
opposed the Court's refusal to recognize the First Amendment rights of
two defendants who had published leaflets attacking American participa-
tion in the Russian civil war.
In some important respects the two dissents share common premises
that have been seminal in the development of modern constitutional law.
These premises, in turn, stem from strands in utilitarian theory that sub-
stantially influenced Holmes' thought." Both opinions, for example, man-
ifest a profound distrust of deductive reasoning97 and a skepticism about
whether one can ever justify decisions regarding ends and values. 8 In
Lochner, he warned that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete
cases,"99 and that constitutional decisions "will depend on a judgment or
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise. ' 0 He was,
therefore, unwilling to allow the case to turn on his view of the correct-
93. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
94. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
95. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
96. See generally H. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OI.IVER WENDELL HOLMFS AND UTILrrARIAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1984) (discussing utilitarian influences on Holmes).
97. For an attempt to trace the utilitarian roots of this distrust of syllogistic reasoning to the
works of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart-Mill, and John Austin, see id. at 106-26. Austin was espe-
cially insistent that judges reason from analogy rather than through a syllogistic process. See, e.g., J.
AUS-rIN, 2 LE(rURS ON JURISPRUDENCE 1036-55 (1873).
98. The distinguishing feature of utilitarian morality, in all its various permutations, is its conse-
quentialist base which depends, in turn, on agnosticism about the appropriate sources of the utility to
be maximized. See, e.g., Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILI-
TARIANISM: FOR AND A;AINSr 79-80, 82-85 (1973). For Holmes, this agnosticism ran very deeply.
He wrote that:
[d]eep-seated preferences can not be argued about-you can not argue a man into liking a
glass of beer-and therefore, when differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the
other man rather than let him have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting
that, so far as appears, his grounds are just as good as ours.
0. HOLM-S, CoL.I.EcaErD LEGAL PAPERS 312 (1921). See generally H. POHLMAN, supra note 96, at
11-47 (discussing Holmes' agnosticism concerning values).
99. 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
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ness of the policy behind the New York statute; were the correctness of
that policy at issue, he "should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind."1 1 In Abrams, Holmes was willing to venture the
opinion that the defendants' creed was one of "ignorance and immaturity
when honestly held."10 2 But his argument for constitutional protection
rested crucially on his inability to be certain of the correctness of this
judgment. Thus, he acknowledged that "[ilf you have no doubt of your
premises . . . and want a certain result with all your heart,"'0 3 protection
for opposing ideas would make little sense. Freedom of speech has value
only because "men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths."10 Ironically, Holmes insisted on skepticism even with regard to
his own skeptical theory. The most he would say was that it "is an exper-
iment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge."' 05
Closely allied to this skepticism was Holmes' belief that the Constitu-
tion required government neutrality with respect to competing individual
conceptions of the good. Because such conceptions cannot be derived from
deductive logic, and because no one can be certain which conception is
correct, advocates of any particular conception should not be permitted to
capture our collective institutions.'0 6 Instead, government has an obliga-
tion to accord equal weight to the desires of each of its citizens. Thus, for
Holmes, the Lochner majority was wrong to frustrate the will of the New
York legislature because it was insisting on "an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain." 0 7 The Constitution was
"not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of pater-
nalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
")108faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views ....
Similarly in Abrams, Holmes was unwilling to entertain the notion that
the defendants could be punished because they had a deviant conception of
the good. However silly or pernicious their beliefs seemed, "no one has a
right even to consider [the creed that they avow] in dealing with the
charges before the Court."'0 9
These central premises of the Lochner and Abrams dissents-an insis-
101. Id. at 75.
102. 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 630.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The requirement of government neutrality, in this sense, is a central tenet of modern liber-
alism. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 15, at 10-15.
107. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 75-76.
109. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tence on value and rule skepticism, on government neutrality, and on the
equal status of competing conceptions of the good-have been profoundly
influential in the development of liberal constitutional theory. But there is
also a tension between Holmes' position in Abrams and his position in
Lochner-a tension that, in the long run, has turned out to be even more
significant than the shared premises. Although both opinions are heavily
influenced by value and rule skepticism, that skepticism leads Holmes to
opposite conclusions in the two cases. In Lochner Holmes argues that
value skepticism required deference to the legislature, yet in Abrams the
same skepticism required judicial invalidation of the statute, at least as
applied. In Lochner, Holmes refused to saddle the country with the view
that laissez faire economics necessarily produces a just and efficient distri-
bution of goods. In Abrams, he insisted that the First Amendment estab-
lishes a free marketplace of ideas 10 that will necessarily yield the truth.
In Lochner, he was willing to permit the legislature to proceed on the
theory that private markets were not necessarily free, and that government
intervention might be necessary to offset inequalities in bargaining power.
Yet his Abrams opinion seems to rest on the belief that speech is automat-
ically "free" when the government does not restrict it and that conflicting
ideas will compete on an equal basis as long as the government does not
intervene.
Holmes' ambivalent attitude toward government power is symptomatic
of deeper difficulties with utilitarian thought. On the one hand, as a polit-
ical theory, utilitarianism seems to argue for deference to the legislative
branch: Whatever its deficiencies, the legislature is the public institution
that most fairly aggregates individual preferences. Moreover, any effort by
judges to use legal reasoning from natural law principles or the constitu-
tional text to control the legislature's product would necessarily resort to
"general propositions" that "do not decide concrete cases."' 11
On the other hand, as a moral theory, utilitarianism demands that indi-
vidual conduct be guided by principles of universal utility maximization.
If one grants broad deference to legislative decisions, one must accept the
risk that some of those decisions may arise from preferences that cannot be
justified under a system of utilitarian morality. For example, the legisla-
ture might outlaw expression of deviant political views because a majority
rejects the right of a minority to pursue certain conceptions of the good.
Thus, if one accepts utilitarian political theory and opts for legislative
autonomy, one must be prepared to live with some legislative results that
110. See id.
111. 198 U.S. at 76. On the association between utilitarian morality and representative govern-
ment, see Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 843 (1979).
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could not be justified on utilitarian moral theory. 12 Indeed, utilitarian
political theory may itself amount to no more than "general propositions"
that "do not decide concrete cases." Holmes seems to acknowledge this
possibility in Lochner: "The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long
as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which
has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers,"' 3 cannot serve as a
test for the constitutionality of legislation.
Deferring to the legislature in this fashion, however, permits the very
thing that utilitarian theory says must be resisted-the capture of our
public institutions by proponents of some particular conception of the
good and the suppression of competing conceptions. Holmes acknowledged
in Abrams that his theory is no more than an "experiment," 1 4 but he was
unwilling to allow the theory to consume itself. Therefore,
[w]hile that experiment is part of our system[,] ...we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country."1 5
B. The Carolene Products Compromise
So long as the Court remained within the control of natural law theo-
rists of the right, these contradictions in utilitarian thought could be re-
pressed. Justice Holmes and his allies could take as given the "general
propositions" that restricted legislative power and argue that, if these pro-
positions were to control at all, they ought to be deployed in a manner
112. As Professor Dworkin has argued, rigid adherence to the requirement that all preferences
should be counted equally leads utilitarianism into an internal contradiction:
Suppose, for example, that a number of individuals in the community hold racist rather than
utilitarian political theories. They believe, not that each man is to count for one and no one for
more than one in the distribution of goods, but rather that a black man is to count for less and
a white man therefore to count for more than one .... If this preference or pleasure is given
the normal weight in a utilitarian calculation, and blacks suffer accordingly, then their own
assignment of goods and opportunities will depend, not simply on the competition among per-
sonal preferences that abstract statements of utilitarianism suggest, but precisely on the fact
that they are thought less worthy of concern and respect than others are.
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIcGHis SERIOUSLY 275 (1978); see also Williams, supra note 98, at 135-50.
But see Hart, supra note 111, at 828, 843 ("Where those who are denied by a majority vote the
liberty they seek are able ... to continue to press their views in public argument ... it seems quite
impossible to construe every denial of liberty by a majority vote based on external preferences as a
judgment that the minority whom it defeats are of inferior worth.").
113. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
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that suited their ends." 6 When the sudden collapse of the old order in the
late 1930's, and the ascendancy of the Roosevelt majority, cast doubt on
these "general propositions," the need for reconciling the opposing impli-
cations of utilitarian theory became more pressing.
Two polar resolutions were possible. On the one hand, the new major-
ity might have taken seriously the claim of value skepticism and opted for
legislative supremacy. On the other hand, it might have taken seriously
the claim of equality in pursuit of the good and opted for judicial inter-
vention whenever legislative action or inaction threatened such equality.
Although elements of the new majority became associated with each of
these poles, the dominant force in modern constitutional theory emerged
from an effort to forge a compromise between them. That compromise,
embodied in the famous Carolene Products footnote, 17 coupled a limited
textualism with a heavily process-oriented form of judicial review.
Where a specific constitutional provision limited the legislature, there
was no need for the Court to rely upon its own value judgments to justify
intervention. On the contrary, value skepticism argued for rigid judicial
adherence to those values specifically articulated in the constitutional text.
The Court could therefore block implementation of certain legislative val-
ues without having to justify values of its own. 1 8
In the absence of specific textual provisions, judicial intervention was
more problematic. It could still be justified, however, if the Court re-
frained from articulating values itself and merely insisted that the legisla-
tive process fairly reflect and aggregate competing views. Thus, if the leg-
islature restricted "those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,"' 9 or acted
against "discrete and insular minorities" where "prejudice" tended "seri-
116. See Cover, supra note 31, at 1288 (recognition by Holmes and Brandeis of "a limited role
for substantive due process was tactical only and highly contingent").
117. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
118. The first paragraph of the footnote states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legis-
lation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth.
Id. at 152 n.4. Apparently added at the insistence of Chief Justices Hughes, see Lusky, Footnote
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1982), the paragraph is
puzzling in two respects. First, its endorsement of textualism stands in sharp contrast to the functional
thrust of the following two paragraphs. See Cover, supra note 31, at 1291. Second, even on its own
terms, the endorsement is contradictory, since the Court provides no textual argument for its support
of the incorporation doctrine.
119. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The second paragraph of the footnote states:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Id.
1034
Vol. 96: 1006, 1987
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities," 2 a court might alter the outcome to
yield the result that would have emerged from a properly functioning leg-
islative process.
In the years since Justice Stone first formulated the Carolene Products
compromise, it has been subjected to a series of withering critiques.121
Although its deficiencies are plain enough, there are elements of brilliance
in its reconciliation of the competing strands of utilitarian thought. Most
obviously, the compromise seemed to reconcile value skepticism with an
insistence on utilitarian values. By channelling value inquiry into either
noncontroversial textual provisions or process values, the Court hoped to
avoid the embarassment of appearing to foist its own values on the rest of
the country. Yet the textual and process review, which Carolene Products
preserved, seemed to give the Court adequate tools to correct the major-
ity's systematic undervaluation of minority group welfare.
More subtly, there was also reason to hope that Carolene Products
would harness judicial review in support of an interventionist political
agenda. During the Lochner era, judicial review too often led to the frus-
tration of political initiatives to redistribute power and resources in the
private sphere. Many of those supporting Carolene Products were sym-
pathetic to such initiatives. The Carolene Products compromise promised
to legitimate and support such intervention. By insuring that the political
branches fairly represented everyone and remained open to political check,
the Court could neutralize a potent argument against government interfer-
ence with private markets. Paradoxically, by invalidating certain kinds of
legislation, the Court was able to provide a necessary predicate for more
general legislative dominance over the private sphere. Carolene Products
thus promised to turn the traditional role of judicial review on its head.
Yet for all its brilliance, the Carolene Products compromise ultimately
failed. The various weaknesses of the compromise are by now familiar,
and there is no need to rehearse them in detail. For present purposes, the
most significant problems stem from its failure to tame the very value-
120. The footnote's concluding paragraph states:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed
at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities, . . . whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
121. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 31; Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131
(1981); Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981);
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1072-77 (1980). For some judicial critiques, see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656-57 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
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skepticism that necessitated the compromise in the first place. Without
effective control, the corrosive force of this skepticism could be turned on
the compromise itself. Thus, textualism, even in its most sophisticated in-
carnations, does not confine judicial discretion sufficiently to legitimate ju-
dicial power. 22 Moreover, the process values upon which Carolene Prod-
ucts relied proved to be neither uncontroversial nor capable of
disentanglement from substantive decisions. For example, repeated incan-
tations of the "one person, one vote" slogan failed to hide the fact that
there are different ways to aggregate individual votes and that these dif-
ferent methods, none of which is obviously "unfair," yield radically differ-
ent outcomes. 28 Similarly, the compromise provided no obvious method
for distinguishing between groups that failed politically because of system-
atic "prejudice" and groups that were simply outvoted-between homo-
sexuals and exhibitionists, in Professor Tribe's telling example. 24
Characterizing Carolene Products as resting on controversial value de-
terminations allowed the contradictions in the utilitarian position to
reemerge. Indeed, the characterization revealed that the compromise itself
rested on a contradiction. Advocates of Carolene Products never ade-
quately explained how equal representation was advanced by vesting
power in our least representative institution. Granted, legislative bodies
function imperfectly and not all groups are adequately represented, but no
institutional arrangements function perfectly. The relevant question
should be comparative rather than absolute: Is vesting power in one insti-
tution "better" than vesting it in another? 25 When viewed from this per-
spective, it is difficult to refute those who argue that the choice between
competing theories of public representation is itself a public question, best
resolved by the institution most responsive to the public will.1 26
122. On the problems with textualism, see generally Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 885 (1985); Tushnet, supra note 77, at 784-802.
123. See, e.g., Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 252, 275-84.
124. Tribe, supra note 121, at 1075-76; see also Ackerman, supra note 31, at 731-37 (describing
the empirical factors that might inform claims of prejudice).
125. See generally Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Consti-
tutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1984).
126. Dean Ely has argued that elected representatives are subject to an inherent conflict of inter-
est in assessing whether the process by which voters choose them is fairly representative. As "compar-
ative outsiders in our governmental system," appointed judges are better able "objectively to assess
claims . . . that either by clogging the channels of change or by acting as accessories to majority
tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those whom the system
presupposes they are." J. ELY, supra note 27, at 103. But as Professor Komesar has demonstrated,
this argument rests on a non sequitur. Legislators may indeed be subject to a conflict of interest when
they investigate the limits of their own power. But it does not follow that judges are "comparative
outsiders" less subject to the temptations of biased self-aggrandizement. When a court asserts the
power to invalidate a statute, it not only curbs legislative power, but also enhances its own power.
There is therefore no neutral solution to the problem of tyranny. The appropriate question to ask is
not whether the legislature is perfectly responsive to the popular will, but whether, conceding all the
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Ironically, this failure to legitimate judicial intervention also frustrated
the hope of Carolene Products' supporters that the compromise would
help guarantee governmental supremacy over the private sphere and
thereby further the interventionist political agenda. The interventionist
theory of autonomy required confident assertions of government power to
control the private forces limiting real freedom. In theory, the Carolene
Products compromise might have provided a basis for enlisting the courts
in this endeavor. When the political branches failed to intervene to ad-
vance the causes of powerless minorities, the Court might have required
the government programs that would have been adopted if these minori-
ties had been fairly represented.
Although the Court has occasionally flirted with the interventionist ver-
sion of Carolene Products," " the activist potential of the compromise has
rarely been realized. The reasons for this failure almost surely relate to
the indeterminate character of the compromise. Even if the Court could
formulate clear standards of "fair" representation, the effort to construct a
hypothetical political process and predict its various trade-offs would be
staggeringly complex.128 In the absence of such standards, action-forcing
judicial intervention would be perceived as the kind of judicial interference
with the legislative process that the compromise was designed to avoid.
Some cases concerning the problem of gender discrimination illustrate
the nature and depth of these difficulties. In Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney,129 the Court considered the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
veterans' preference statute that required the state to fill all civil service
positions with qualifying veterans before hiring any qualified nonveteran.
Although the preference overwhelmingly favored males, the Court held
that it did not constitute gender discrimination and, therefore, did not ap-
ply heightened review. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart conceded
that "[i]t would. . be disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences
of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were
not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable."'1 ' Nonethe-
problems with representation, it is likely to be more responsive than the available alternative. See
Komesar, supra note 125, at 400-05.
127. See supra note 17.
128. Even in its negative version, the theory rests on significant oversimplifications. As Professor
Ackerman has demonstrated, it simply does not follow from the "political powerlessness" of a group
that the group would have prevailed if it were unhampered by an inability to form coalitions. Acker-
man, supra note 31, at 720-22. Moreover, a group's "discreteness" and "insularity" may actually
serve to enhance, rather than diminish, its political power by reducing the "free rider" problems
associated with organizing political activity, lessening organizational costs, and eliminating the "exit"
option. See id. at 722-31.
129. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
130. Id. at 278.
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less, he argued, the preference was not infected by a discriminatory pur-
pose because
"[d]iscriminatory purpose" implies that the decisionmaker...
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. Yet nothing in the record demonstrates that this
preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-
enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping
women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts
Civil Service."'
For anyone committed to the action-forcing implications of the
Carolene Products compromise, this limited definition of discriminatory
purpose must appear indefensible. Of course, Carolene Products requires
heightened scrutiny when the majority passes legislation motivated by the
sadistic urge to reduce the welfare of an underrepresented minority group.
But it is the rare case indeed in which the legislature harms a minority
"because of" rather than "in spite of" this effect. More frequently, lack of
adequate representation will cause the legislature to fail to pursue policies
benefitting the minority, or to undervalue the minority's welfare when it
pursues policies benefitting the majority. There is no reason in principle
why Carolene Products should not require restructuring political out-
comes when lack of representation leads to this kind of discrimination.
Thus, the appropriate question is not whether the Massachusetts legisla-
ture enacted the veterans' preference in order to harm women, but
whether it would have enacted the same preference if the disadvantaged
group had been men."3 2
When one begins to pursue the implications of this question, however,
difficulties immediately appear. Even if the counterfactual is restricted to
the transposition of men and women, it is hard to see how a court can do
more than speculate on the likely political outcome. More significantly,
the counterfactual cannot be so restricted. A world in which women,
rather than men, would benefit from a veterans' preference would be a
very different-indeed, virtually unrecognizable-place. The socialization,
perceptions, and desires of men and women would be profoundly altered,
and these changes would, in turn, alter public policy in wholly unpredict-
able ways.1 33
131. Id. at 279.
132. Cf Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1976) (antidiscrimination principle protects minorities
when ostensibly valid reasons for discriminatory rule hide (possibly unconscious) improper motive).
133. The problems run still deeper. In a culture in which socialization differed so radically,
women might not perceive themselves as a cohesive group and, therefore, might not perceive their
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These difficulties are further compounded when one begins to consider
the effects of restructuring on the goals of the legislature. Both the Feeney
majority and dissent assume a basic methodology according to which the
constitutionality of a veterans' preference is determined by investigating
with varying degrees of rigor the nexus between the means (the prefer-
ence) and the supposed end (rewarding veterans for service to their coun-
try). But it is surely simplistic to treat the end as necessarily unconnected
to the discrimination under attack. It is possible, for example, that in a
world in which men did not dominate women, the legislature would be
interested in rewarding people who made peace rather than war.
The manner in which power is currently distributed between men and
women has the potential to affect not only which ends the legislature pur-
sues, but also the behavior of men and women with respect to those ends.
Consider, for example, the problem posed by Craig v. Boren,"' in which
the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute permitting women, but not
men, between the ages of 18 and 20 to buy 3.2% beer. Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan was confronted with a series of empirical stud-
ies tending to show that a much higher proportion of men than women in
the relevant age group was arrested for driving while drunk. Although
Justice Brennan attempts to discredit the empirical evidence, this portion
of his opinion is strikingly unpersuasive. '35 Conceding as much, he con-
cludes by dismissing this entire line of analysis With the observation that
"proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business,
and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause." '
Justice Brennan does not specify the source of this tension, but he may
exclusion as discrimination. See J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 117
(1983) (blacks might not perceive themselves as cohesive group in absence of discrimination).
134. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
135. The state relied primarily on statistical evidence purporting to demonstrate that 2% of the
males, but only 0.18% of the females, in the relevant age group were arrested for alcohol-related
driving offenses. See id. at 201. Superficially, it might seem that the fact that better than ten times
more men than women were arrested for drunken driving would constitute fairly persuasive evidence
for a gender-based distinction. But instead of focusing on the disparity between the male and female
arrest rates, Justice Brennan attempted to dissipate the impact of the evidence by focusing on the low
overall arrest rate for men. Id. at 200-02. The attempt is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First,
as Justice Rehnquist argues in his dissent, the low overall arrest rate seems more relevant to a sub-
stantive due process attack on any ban on alcohol consumption than to an equal protection attack on
the differential treatment of men and women. See id. at 225-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover,
it is far from clear that the arrest rate is too low to justify the ban. Two percent of the relevant male
population, although only a small fraction of the total, may nonetheless be a very large absolute
number capable of inflicting tremendous social costs. The actual number of males in the relevant age
group who drink and drive is likely to be still larger, since the study recorded only those unlucky
enough to be arrested for alcohol-related offenses. Finally, it is important to understand that 2% of
young men were caught drinking and driving despite the existence of laws prohibiting this conduct.
But surely widespread obedience to a law does not demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional.
136. Id. at 204.
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well be concerned about the need to break the mutually reenforcing nexus
between culture and behavior. It may be true, for example, that in our
culture men are more likely than women to drink and drive-perhaps
because the ability to "hold" alcohol is somehow associated with mascu-
linity or because men are expected to drive when men and women are in a
car together. But this behavior cannot be taken as a given, uninfluenced
by the complex socialization of men and women in our society. One sig-
nificant component of that socialization is the content of messages sent by
government actions, such as those under attack in the very case to be de-
cided. In a world where men and women are sent different messages
about how they should behave, they might well behave differently. Thus,
if the statute is judged solely in terms of whether it tracks existing behav-
ior, there is an unacceptable risk that it will become self-validating.
It follows that anyone seriously committed to a Carolene Products
analysis of gender discrimination should treat neither the goals of the leg-
islature nor the behavior of men and women as exogenous. Rather, one
must ask what goals the legislature would pursue and how the behavior of
men and women would interact with those goals in a "natural" state
where people's conduct and desires would be uninfluenced by existing
hierarchies.
There are some famous examples of the Court's efforts to pursue this
line of analysis. For example, over a century ago, Justice Bradley was
uninfluenced by the "exceptional cases" of women who, in the existing
culture, pursued legal careers.18 7 Instead, he was prepared to judge the
constitutionality of Illinois' refusal to permit women to practice law by
measuring it against "the nature of things,"13' allowing him to identify
"the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood."1 9 Nor is it necessary to rummage through dis-
carded precedents from the last century to see-how the Court has adminis-
tered a "natural law" approach once freed from the constraints of existing
behavior and norms. Without any empirical support, modern majorities
have held that men "by nature" suffer few consequences from teenage
pregnancy140 and that it is "natural" for women to be more closely at-
tached to young children than men.141
Results such as these ought to give pause to advocates of an interven-
tionist version of Carolene Products. Because no one knows how people
137. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in
judgment).
138. Id. at 142.
139. Id. at 141.
140. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981).
141. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); cf. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(easier to identify mother of illegitimate child than father).
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would act apart from their culture, any effort to specify a natural state of
affairs quickly degenerates into an effort to implement some normative
vision of how people should act."42 But at this point, all the old doubts
about the ability of judges to defend such a vision-doubts that gave birth
to the Carolene Products compromise in the first place-reassert
themselves.
These doubts, in turn, have caused the Court to adhere for the most
part to a libertarian version of the compromise that gives the Court a
much less intrusive role. Consider, for example, the Washington v. Da-
vis143 doctrine and the Court's modern state action jurisprudence.1 44
These cases treat Carolene Products as prohibiting, rather than mandat-
ing, government intervention. The state of affairs that exists in the ab-
sence of government action serves as a benchmark that avoids the necessity
for speculation about how things might be in a reconstructed world. Gov-
ernment action departing from the benchmark, by making the status of
minorities worse, requires justification. In contrast, when the government
fails to act, by leaving exercises of private power that harm minorities
undisturbed, it bears no responsibility for the results. 45
But the most damning criticism of the compromise relates to relevance
rather than legitimacy or coherence. The problem is not solely that
Carolene Products fails to counteract the centrifugal forces of utilitarian
jurisprudence or that it does not legitimate a form of judicial review con-
sistent with the interventionist theory of autonomy. More fundamentally,
Carolene Products simply fails to describe what has been going on. Many
of the Court's most important constitutional pronouncements in recent
years-in particular its decisions concerning reproductive autonomy and
family values 14 -seem to have no relationship to Carolene Products
analysis in either its interventionist or libertarian incarnations. While a
few defenders of the compromise have disavowed these decisions for pre-
cisely this reason,147 many others have embraced the new privacy. 4 But
142. For an especially insightful discussion of this point, see R. WASsERSTROM, PHILOSOPHY
AND SOCIAL IssuEs 34 (1980).
143. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978). For an excellent critique, see Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982).
145. See supra notes 17-18.
146. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
147. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
148. See, e.g., Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function
of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689, 733 (1976); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1, 11-22 (1973). For some efforts to defend some aspects of the new privacy in Carolene Products
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no one has yet articulated a comprehensive theory reconciling judicial pro-
tection for a private sphere with the interventionist bias that initially mo-
tivated the search for compromise.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AS BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE
A. The Boundary Problem
If the argument spelled out in Section I is correct, then it is important
to establish some boundary between a universalist governmental and non-
governmental institutions where people can make particularist decisions.
Yet our experience with Lochner's aftermath detailed in Section II leaves
us skeptical of the Court's ability to use the tools of logic and precedent to
chart such a boundary.
It is important to understand, however, that a theory premised on the
desirability of conflict between universal and particular values need not
specify a permanent location for the boundary. On the contrary, unlike
competing libertarian views, such a theory denies the possibility that any
permanent boundary can ever be drawn. Any effort to establish such a
fixed line would involve a grand reconciliation between particularist and
universalist impulses. But the theory holds that such a reconciliation
would be undesirable: Whole persons must forever be caught between im-
pulses that are inherently and unavoidably contradictory.
Because a final resolution of the public/private distinction is neither
possible nor desirable, there is a need for some institution to police an
ever-shifting boundary. If it is true, as argued above, that context influ-
ences preference,"4 9 we cannot expect the political process operating alone
to fix a boundary that accurately takes into account the weight of our
conflicting universalist and particularist impulses.
There are a number of reasons why the voting and representational
process is likely to understate the force of particularist values. One diffi-
culty with this process is apparent from the previous discussion: If, as
civic virtue theorists contend, collective decisionmaking mechanisms cause
people to think in universalist terms, 150 then the decisions that people
make when they vote, or work for political causes, or participate in public,
abstract debate will systematically understate the private preferences they
would state in more private contexts.
Moreover, this conclusion would still be valid even if we assumed, con-
terms, see L. TRIBE, CONSrITUrIONAL CHOICES 243 (1985); Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1028, 1036-37 (1976) (reviewing G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (9th ed. 1975)).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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trary to reality, that individual choices between particularist and univer-
salist values are stable and unitary. This is so because distortions are in-
troduced not only when citizens think about how to vote, but also when
they think about whether to vote. Voter apathy is a striking and disturbing
feature of American democracy."' One extremely plausible explanation
for this apathy is that voting is simply irrational for anyone whose private
and public aspects of personality are in reasonable balance. On the one
hand, the chance of an individual vote affecting the outcome of even local
elections is negligible. On the other, the disruption of one's private life in
casting a ballot, while usually not overwhelming, is not trivial. It seems
likely that people who choose to make private sacrifices to perform this
public duty have either an impoverished private life or an exaggerated
sense of public responsibility. It would hardly be surprising if the candi-
dates supported by such an electorate tended to undervalue the private
aspects of our personalities.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, distortion is also built into the
representation process. Even if the electorate fairly represented the popu-
lace as a whole, it is simplistic to suppose that people elected to public
office are precise proxies of those who elect them.152 One important way
in which they are likely to differ is that public officials have less developed
private lives than their constituency. In part, this is true because of self-
selection: Public life is likely to attract individuals who care less about
private relationships than most of us. Moreover, the dynamic of electoral
politics often means that even individuals who have well-developed private
lives before they seek public office are forced to sacrifice them when they
enter politics. Election to important public office often forces a politician
151. See, e.g., R. CANTOR, VOTING BEHAVIOR & PRESIDENTIAL ELECrIONS 84 (1975); C.
JOHNSON, NONVOTING AMERICANS (1980) (published by U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
152. Distrust of public officials was a significant current in radical Whig political theory, which
played an important role in pre-constitutional American thought. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776c1787 (1969):
The theory of government that the Americans clarified in their reading and discussion pos-
sessed a compelling simplicity: politics was nothing more than a perpetual battle between the
passions of the rulers, whether one or a few, and the united interests of the people-an opposi-
tion that was both inevitable and proportional.
Id. at 18. Radical Whigs doubted that this dualism could be overcome by any representational
process.
Power in the hands of an elected ruler, no less than in a hereditary one, was still presumed to
exist autonomously. . . . Thus mere popular election, in place of royal appointment or heredi-
tary succession, was no substantial guarantee against tyranny. . . . The Americans knew they
had among themselves "tyrants enough at heart"; and although their governors would now be
elected periodically by the people or their representatives,, so intoxicating and corrupting was
the power of ruling that an elected magistrate was actually no less to be dreaded than an
hereditary one.
Id. at 135. The distrust of elected representatives and fear of corruption through the process of repre-
sentation remain important strands of popular American perceptions of politics. They are nonetheless
substantially ignored in interventionist theories of judicial review.
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to make her private life public. Paradoxically, the promotion of private
values in public forums corrupts those values.153
Thus, one cannot depend on the political process alone to prevent pub-
lic invasion of private values. Unfortunately, however, the relationship be-
tween context and preference suggests that other potential mechanisms for
establishing the boundary are likely to produce similar distortions. Be-
cause any mechanism to establish and police the boundary must itself be
either public or private, it is likely to produce the very interpenetration
that the boundary is designed to avoid.
Consider, for example, the problem posed by Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.1 " An East Cleveland housing ordinance prohibited Mrs.
Moore from living with two of her grandchildren who were first cousins.
Striking down the statute, Justice Powell observed for a plurality that the
law was not entitled to "the usual judicial deference" because the City
had undertaken "intrusive regulation of the family."" 5 When the govern-
ment limits "choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court
must examine carefully the importance of the government interests ad-
vanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation." 156
The difficulty with Powell's position is self-evident. The East Cleve-
land ordinance purported to respect fully "choices concerning family liv-
ing arrangements." It simply defined "family" to exclude the living ar-
rangement of the Moore household. Thus, a protection of "family"
rationale supports the plurality decision only if supplemented by a rule
that precludes public definition of the boundary between "family" and
153. Consider, for example, the recurring spectacle of American politicians making public use of
their private lives. Elected officials who publicly proclaim their affection for their spouses or permit
"exclusive interviews" about "intimate" details of their family life are not expressing true private
values. The very act of making their private lives public corrupts private values and transforms them
into something quite different. This phenomenon is not restricted to politicians who make strategic use
of their "private" lives. The recent experience of former Senator Paul Tsongas illustrates that even
good faith efforts to make public our private values necessarily transforms those values. Informed that
he was suffering from a life-threatening illness, Tsongas apparently came to a realization that he was
neglecting the private side of his personality and left public office in order to give greater attention to
private values. See Tsongas Votes for Family and Home, Boston Globe, Jan. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
Even if there were no more to the story, it is surely revealing that Tsongas felt called upon to leave
public office in order to have a meaningful private life. The aftermath of the public announcement of
his decision is even more revealing. For a brief period, Tsongas' family became a topic of public
discussion. Feature stories about his family life, interviews with his spouse, and pictures of him "re-
laxing" with his family appeared in countless newspapers. See, e.g., All for the Family: Paul and
Niki Tsongas Are Making Up for Lost Time, Boston Globe, Mar. 27, 1984, at 23, col. 3; Paul
Tsongas & the Choice of a Lifetime, Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1984, at Cl, col. 5. Paradoxically, his
very assertion in a public forum of his desire to lead a private life at least briefly destroyed his ability
to maintain a life that was private in any meaningful sense.
154. 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
155. Id. at 499.
156. Id.
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"nonfamily." Of course, if public institutions were given unfettered power
to define this boundary, they could use it to occupy space that should be
reserved for private decisions and special relationships. But it is no more
satisfactory to allow each individual or group total freedom to define
"family." Such private definitions might invade the public space where
individuals are not entitled to special treatment, but must restrain their
non-utility maximizing behavior. For example, if the East Cleveland
neighborhood were permitted to define itself as a "family," it could be
freed of the obligation to treat all its members with impersonal equality
and beneficence and, therefore, might be protected in its assertion of the
right to exclude Mrs. Moore.1 57 Indeed, the East Cleveland plurality it-
self recognized the need for limits on private definitions of "family" when
it reaffirmed and distinguished the Court's prior decision in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,158 which upheld the constitutionality of a public
definition in a zoning ordinance that prohibited "families" of wholly un-
related individuals from living together.
This recurring problem of boundary definition threatens to make the
entire enterprise of constitutional adjudication incoherent. Consider, for
example, the problem of finding an appropriate definition of "religion"
for purposes of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Presuma-
bly, the clause is premised on the notion that religious practice and belief
should be left in the private sphere. Unless we are prepared to permit
private vetoes of all collective decisions, however, we must place some
public limit on what counts as a "religion."1 59 The need for this publicly
defined boundary creates inevitable controversies over what are and are
not "real" religions. Public institutions thus must make judgments about
whether deviant sects comport with the officially adopted criteria for reli-
gious faith-in the name of protecting religious belief from government
interference! 0
157. See Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329, 390-91; cf. M. WALZER,
SPHERES OF JuSTICE 36-39 (1983) (discussing nature of the neighborhood).
158. 416 U.S. 1 (1973).
159. Compare, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (conscientious objector
statute construed to include belief that "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by" the orthodox belief in God) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) ("[If the
Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis."). For a summary
of the secondary literature, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 1369-73.
160. Defining "religion" broadly in order to avoid this difficulty, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826-28 (1978), only forces its reemergence in the guise of determining the
sort of state interest that is sufficient to overcome the religious claim. Consider Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), where a sharply divided Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the
application of an Air Force regulation prohibiting personnel from wearing headgear while indoors.
Plaintiff was an orthodox Jewish officer who was disciplined for wearing a yarmulke. In his spirited
dissent, Justice Brennan attempted to confront a "slippery slope" argument premised on the possibil-
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A final example, drawn from the jurisprudence of reproductive auton-
omy, demonstrates that the problem becomes still more complicated when
there is a need to police the boundary among private groups. Roe v.
Wade""1 suggests that a woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy should be her own. Merely leaving the decision in the private
sphere, however, does not necessarily mean that it will be autonomous. If
the parents of a pregnant minor attempt to stop her from securing an
abortion, it simply will not work to say that "family" decisionmaking
should be left in the private sphere, as both sides advance conflicting
claims based on the autonomy of family. Nor is it clear how public insti-
tutions can avoid policing this boundary because whatever those institu-
tions do must result in victory by one of the private parties. This dilemma
has, once again, caused the Court to turn its own doctrine on its head:
The Roe Court's insistence that the abortion decision remain in the pri-
vate sphere has been transmogrified into a constitutional requirement that
the states provide access to a public forum for review of that decision. 62
B. Boundaries Without Maps
Unfortunately, the boundary problem is built into any legal doctrine
that rests on enforceable maintenance of separate spheres.' 3 Indeed, the
intractability of the problem may add weight to the arguments against a
separate spheres approach and in favor of a more complete integration of
conflicting values.
ity of free exercise claims for less familiar religious attire. After pointing out that turbans, saffron
robes, and dreadlocks were not before the Court, Brennan conceded that "a reviewing court could
legitimately give deference to dress and grooming rules that have a reasoned basis in, for example,
functional utility, health and safety considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional appear-
ance." Id. at 1319 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens' response in his concurring opinion perfectly
states the boundary dilemma:
The very strength of [petitioner's] claim creates the danger that a similar claim on behalf of a
Sikh or a Rastafarian might readily be dismissed as "so extreme, so unusual, or so faddish an
image that public confidence in his ability to perform his duties will be destroyed." If excep-
tions from dress code regulations are to be granted on the basis of a multifactored test[,]...
inevitably the decisionmaker's evalu[tion of the character and the sincerity of the requestor's
faith-as well as the probable reaction of the majority to the favored treatment of a member of
that faith-will play a critical part in the decision.
Id. at 1316 (quoting Justice Brennan's opinion).
161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), a plurality of the Court held:
[If the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain [parental] consent to an abortion, it
also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained.
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show. . . that even if she is not able to
make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.
Id. at 643-44 (citations omitted); see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-95 (1983).
163. See generally Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and
Politics, 28 BUFFA.o L. REv. 383 (1979).
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Because I think that there is no solution to the problem, it would be
foolish to argue that judicial review provides one. But I do want to make a
more modest claim: Judicial enforcement of constitutional rights can best
be understood as our society's imperfect effort to deal with the boundary
problem, particularly in the public/private context. Courts are suited to
play a mediating role between public and private spheres because they are
the most private of our public institutions. Their ambivalent position is
built into the way judges are selected, the way they are permitted to lead
their lives, and the very nature of judging as it has evolved in American
legal culture.
Whether in fact these institutional arrangements mean that judges faced
with the problem of boundary maintenance react differently from other
government actors is an empirical question of some complexity that I do
not intend to answer here. It may be that the institutional arrangements
shielding judges from the forces influencing those in the legislative and
executive branches have relatively little impact. If this is true, judicial re-
view itself is largely unimportant. Without taking a position on that issue,
I want to argue merely that to the extent that judicial review matters, it
matters because of institutional arrangements that encourage judges to be
in touch with both universalist and particularist values. To the extent that
judges respond to those arrangements, they pose the least risk of invading
either sphere in the process of maintaining the boundary between them.
The most obvious way in which judges are caught between the public
and private spheres relates to their selection and tenure. Judges are public
officials with public responsibilities. There is a sense in which their nomi-
nations and confirmations are political events; but there are also impor-
tant, albeit vague and controversial, constraints on the permissible political
oversight of the nominating process. Although investigations of general
competence (whatever that means) and "judicial philosophy" (an even
vaguer term) are permissible, use of "litmus tests" based on inquiry into
decisions in particular cases is not."" The selection process imposes some
public check on the type of people who become judges, yet leaves judges
free of prior, publicly coerced commitments that might interfere with the
expression of private values in deciding future cases.
The etiquette of nomination and confirmation is not fully worked out
and remains controversial. Moreover, to the extent it is worked out, the
164. For a statement of the conventional view, see L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE
COURT (1985). Tribe argues that "[elach Senator, as well as the President, should determine the
outer boundaries of what is acceptable in terms of a potential Justice's constitutional and judicial
philosophies-a candidate's substantive views of what the law should be, and the candidate's institu-
tional views of what role the Supreme Court should play." Id. at 93. On the other hand, he insists
that "[I]itmus tests that seek out a candidate's unswerving commitment to upholding or reversing a
particular legal precedent are simply not an acceptable part of the appointment process." Id. at 97.
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rules border on self-contradiction. One wonders, for example, why anyone
would care about "judicial philosophy" apart from what it says about
how a nominee will vote in particular cases or, indeed, what "judicial
philosophy" could possibly consist of other than a predisposition to vote
certain ways in certain cases. 1 5 From the perspective of boundary mainte-
nance, however, one would not want these contradictions to be resolved.
Any resolution of them would result in dominance of either the public or
private sphere.
Once in office, judges remain uniquely shielded from political pressures
that undermine the ability of other public officials to balance particularist
and universalist values. Traditionally, the life tenure of federal judges has
been thought to allow them to promote minority or long term interests
free from popular pressures of the moment.16 But in fact, political insula-
tion may be a necessary precondition to a decisionmaking process that
accurately reflects majority sentiment, free from the artificial inflation of
public values produced by the electoral process. Judges who need not
stand for election are less likely to have their decisions distorted in favor of
an electorate in which publicly oriented voters are disproportionately rep-
resented or by the fact that voting may cause people to think in universal-
ist terms. 67
The conflict between universalist and particularist norms is also built
into the very act of deciding constitutional cases, at least as that institution
has developed in this country. In recent years, two of the central debates
about the legitimacy of constitutional review have concerned the con-
straining force of the constitutional text and of "neutral principles." The
165. Professor Tribe argues that the Senate has a special duty not to confirm Supreme Court
nominees appointed solely because they "are found acceptable by a specific political or moral constitu-
ency." Id. at 98. A nominee's adherence to such a "specific presidential agenda" reflects, in Tribe's
view, "an unjudicious commitment not to a coherent constitutional philosophy, but to a slogan or even
the outcome of a single case." Id. at 98. Nominees holding "knee jerk attitudes" towards gun control,
capital punishment, or right to life apparently flunk this test. See id. at 97. Yet Tribe also wants to
insist that adherence to the outcome of certain cases can function as an appropriate litmus test. Thus,
"[slome constitutional landmarks are so crucial to our sense of what America is all about that their
dismantling should be considered off-limits and candidates who would be at all likely to upend them
should therefore be considered unfit." Id. at 94. Apparently, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), the reapportionment and incorporation decisions, and the constitutional protection of
property and contract from "[a) communist notion of regimented social and economic equality" fall
into the latter category. Id. at 94-96. Presumably, Professor Tribe stands ready to provide expert
consultation to those less adept than he at distinguishing between nominees with "knee jerk attitudes"
and those sharing "our sense of what America is all about."
166. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48 (1978).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52. Moreover, the fact that judges are exempted
from electoral politics means that they themselves are permitted to have private lives. Judges may
therefore be able to understand, in a way that most other public officials cannot, the pull between
universal beneficence and particularized special relationships. Because the conflict between these two
impulses is more likely to be a real force in their own lives, they may be better equipped to keep in
balance a regime of institutionalized conflict between private and public values.
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need for a mediating institution that encapsulates the contradiction be-
tween our universalist and particularist selves throws a different light on
both these debates, and suggests that the failure to resolve both debates
contributes to the legitimacy of judicial review.
Consider first the appropriate role for the constitutional text. Although
the constraining force of the text was traditionally believed to be crucial to
the legitimacy of judicial review,l"' an important legacy of utilitarian
skepticism""' is that this view no longer seems plausible. All of the key
concepts in the constitutional text are, in fact, radically indeterminate.17 0
Moreover, the instability of meaning over time,171 the inherent difficulty
of discerning collective intent, 7 2 and the likelihood that at least some
framers meant to allow growth and change in the document's meaning'"3
doom an interpretation based on intent. Finally, even if the original intent
were determinate and discoverable, the question remains why anyone
would think that modern disputes should be resolved by what a small
group of elite white males thought two hundred years ago.174
The collapse of textualism has created something of a crisis in modern
constitutional debate. Today, one would be hard pressed to find anyone in
the mainstream of American politics who favors reversal of all Supreme
Court decisions that exceed the power conferred by a reasonable reading
of the constitutional text. 75 Oddly, this practical victory for nontextualist
168. For the classic statement, see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936):
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the
people's representatives. This is a misconception. . . . When an act of Congress is appropri-
ately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial
branch of the Government has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with
the former.
Id. at 62.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 97-116.
170. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 133-37 ("vague" constitutional guarantees such as
equal protection are appeals to underlying moral concepts, not embodiments of specific prohibitions).
171. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 77, at 793-804.
172. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 122, at 482-83.
173. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 27, at 22-30; R. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 133; Powell,
supra note 122.
174. See Tushnet, supra note 77, at 787-89.
175. For example, Attorney General Edwin Meese has generated considerable controversy by
advocating a rigidly textualist approach. See, e.g., "Meese Attacks Supreme Court Religion Rulings,"
Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1985, at 3, col. 1. Yet he has never suggested that Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), should be overruled, although the textual and historical support for
the holding is dubious at best. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 123-25, 133 (1977). And one wonders what sort of
textualist defense he could possibly mount for Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (school segrega-
tion in District of Columbia violated due process clause of Fifth Amendment), which was based upon
a constitutional provision enacted at a time when blacks were held as slaves. As Professor Perry has
demonstrated, strict adherence to the principle that judicial review should be limited to enforcement of
values constitutionalized by the framers would result in the overruling of most of the modern Court's
"human rights" decisions. See M. PERRY, supra note 53, at 2.
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approaches has been coupled with an increasingly shrill rhetorical insis-
tance that textualism is the only basis for judicial legitimacy.'1
An appreciation of the Supreme Court's role in boundary maintenance
between the public and private spheres suggests a way to understand this
paradox. The indeterminacy of the text is a necessary precondition for the
legitimacy of constitutional review. Some commentators have argued that
the text, or at least certain portions of it, should bind future generations
because it was written during rare moments in our history when most of
the country was politicized.177 In this view, the Constitution represents as
pure an articulation of our public universalist values as we are likely ever
to get. But, precisely because the Constitution is a public document articu-
lating public values, it would be undesirable to let the constitutional text
alone mark the boundary between the public and private spheres. Al-
lowing a public document to determine the boundaries of private power
would build into the system a bias in favor of public values.
It hardly follows, however, that an unambiguous victory for nontextual-
ism would be desirable, as a totally nontextualist approach would risk
private invasion of public values. Judges who feel no necessity to justify
their decisions according to public values might become the mouthpiece of
special interests and sectarian prejudices. The continuing significance of
textualist rhetoric in public debate reflects a healthy awareness of this
danger. The conflict between the public rhetoric of textualism and what
judges inevitably do when they wrestle privately with an indeterminate
text leaves them in an impossible position. From the perspective of bound-
ary maintenance, it is desirable that they remain there. Any clear resolu-
tion of the conflict would prevent judges from fulfilling their mediating
role.
The same pattern of unresolved conflict is discernible in the debate over
neutral principles. Nineteenth century formalism was marked by a belief
that law is a carefully worked-out series of deductions from noncontrover-
sial general principles.178 For anyone with modern sensibilities, this view
of the legal process, like the view that sees constitutional adjudication as
no more than the explication of text, seems impossibly naive. Rules, like
176. See, e.g., "Meese Attacks Supreme Court Religion Rulings," supra note 175.
177. The argument is made most forcefully by Ackerman, supra note 33, who argues that,
[bJy providing a higher lawmaking system, the American Constitution succeeds in constituting
something more than a government in Washington, D.C. It constitutes a system of political
meanings that enable all Americans to indicate the rare occasions when they mean to present
themselves to one another as private citizens, and mark them off from the countless ordinary
occasions when they are content to understand themselves as merely private citizens-for
whom political life is but one of many diversions in the ongoing pursuit of happiness.
Id. at 1042 (emphasis in original).
178. See, e.g., G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 23-37 (1980).
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text, are necessarily indeterminate, 7M and legal reasoning is therefore in-
ductive, particularistic, and pragmatic. The demise of formalism, like the
demise of textualism, has created problems for those worried that an unre-
strained judiciary might fail to act in the public interest. Rule skepticism
leaves judges free to decide individual cases without limiting their freedom
in future cases. Without a meaningful requirement to generalize, judges
are left free to create special "rules" for particular, favored litigants,
thereby threatening the public values associated with universality and im-
personal beneficence.
The "neutral principles" paradigm is an effort to rescue judging from
this dilemma.18 A "neutral principles" approach recognizes the inductive,
particularistic character of judging as both a virtue and a necessity. By
focusing their attention on the facts of particular cases, judges can avoid
the sterile forces of abstraction and reification. They can, in other words,
bring private values, associated with the particular litigants before them,
to bear on their decisions.""' Yet these values are held in check by the
requirement that, however a case is decided, the judge must be willing to
formulate a more general principle that explains the result in the case
before him. One of the things that makes this principle "general" is that it
is intended to apply to anonymous individuals without real personalities
and individualized lifestories that might influence intuitions about appro-
priate outcomes. The neutral principles requirement therefore pushes
judges toward the universalist ideal of equality and impersonal benefi-
cence. Of course, when a subsequent case arises, the judge need not al-
ways follow the principle. The particular facts of the new case-the force
of particularist values-may cause him to abandon it. But if he does so, he
must acknowledge that he has abandoned it and formulate a new "neutral
principle" that takes into account the new decision.
Others have argued with considerable force that the neutral principles
paradigm rests on a contradiction. 82 If the neutral principles are truly
179. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 77, at 821-23 and sources cited therein.
180. The seminal statement of this approach is Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1959).
181. See E. LEVI, AN IN'IRODU(.'rION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948):
[T]he kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one in which the classification changes
as the classification is made. The rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the
rules arise out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the rules and then
applies them. . . . The categories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in order to
permit the infusion of new ideas. And this is true even where legislation or a constitution is
involved. The words used by the legislature or the constitutional convention must come to have
new meanings. Furthermore, agreement on any other basis would be impossible. In this man-
ner the laws come to express the ideas of the community and even when written in general
terms, in statute or constitution, are molded for the specific case.
Id. at 3.
182. The best critique is Tushnet, supra note 77, at 804-24.
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constraining, then judging cannot have the inductive character claimed for
it, and judges will not be able to depart from the rules when they contra-
dict particularist values. On the other hand, if the principles are not truly
constraining (because they are so vague as to be meaningless, or because
rules by their nature cannot constrain, or because the rule can always be
overthrown when it becomes inconvenient to follow it), then the generality
requirement does nothing to legitimate the exercise of judicial power.
What critics of neutral principles fail to understand, however, is that
any effort to bring to bear both private and public values on a decision-
making process will necessarily end in contradiction. People simply hold
different, contradictory beliefs when they think about issues from particu-
larist and universalist perspectives. One result will therefore seem right if
the judge thinks about the problem ex post and cares about doing justice
to the particular individuals before him. Another result will seem equally
right if the judge thinks more broadly about the ex ante incentive effects
of his decision on anonymous individuals and whether the rule to be de-
rived from the case will maximize overall utility. Since these views are
necessarily contradictory, it follows that there cannot be a unified theory
of boundary maintenance. Only a judge who is sensitive to the contradic-
tory demands of public and private values-who is caught between the
desire to do "justice" to the particular, real litigant and the desire to for-
mulate a general rule to maximize utility for the remaining faceless multi-
tude-can be trusted to maintain the boundary between the two spheres
without invading either.
IV. BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE AND THE DILEMMAS OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. New Solutions
In this final section, I want to explore the extent to which a theory
premised on conflict between private and public spheres actually does the
work claimed for it. More specifically, does the theory resolve the nagging
dilemmas that have plagued constitutional thought for fifty years? I con-
clude that the theory successfully resolves some of these difficulties, but at
the price of creating new, and in some ways more serious, problems at a
deeper level.
A theory of boundary maintenance explains both the dilemma of gov-
ernment versus nongovernmental power and the dilemma of universalist
versus particularist values. The theory suggests that we need a govern-
ment sphere to nurture universalist values, but that this very requirement
implies the need for a separate nongovernmental sphere within which
particularist choices can be made.
1052
Vol. 96: 1006, 1987
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law
Moreover, the theory is strikingly successful in resolving the difficulties
that first produced, and ultimately destroyed, the Carolene Products com-
promise. Because the theory does not rest on a claim that particular deci-
sions or activities are "naturally" public or private, it is threatened by
neither rule nor value skepticism. On the contrary, doubts about the con-
straining force of rules and the logical defense of values are important
components of a boundary maintenance approach. Any determinate rule,
text, or doctrine that successfully constrained judges would risk the
supremacy of either public or private values and would therefore be unde-
sirable. Judges are not constrained by text or doctrine, but by the ongoing
conflict between universalist and particularist values in their own work
and lives. Because these values are necessarily contradictory, it is hardly
surprising that they are logically indefensible. The advantage of a theory
premised on conflict, rather than on reconciliation, is that a logical defense
of values becomes unnecessary and undesirable. Any such defense must
presuppose some final resolution of or choice between contradictory de-
mands, whereas the theory claims that a whole person must forever make
contradictory choices depending upon the sphere within which she is
choosing.
A boundary maintenance approach also resolves other anomalies associ-
ated with judicial review. Pluralist and civic virtue theories face serious
difficulty in explaining how public accountability is advanced by granting
power to an institution deliberately shielded from public pressure. 8 A
boundary maintenance theory avoids this difficulty by arguing that a sys-
tem of total public accountability is undesirable because it fails to take
into account private preferences. The theory thus provides a plausible ra-
tionale for the Supreme Court's persistent defense of private power.
B. New Problems
Although the theory may resolve some of the old contradictions by re-
lating the problem of intervention to the problem of private and public
values, it also creates new contradictions on a deeper level that are as
serious as those it resolves. Each of these contradictions, I believe, is in
fact a manifestation of a single contradiction that can be stated simply:
The theory, if true, deprives us of a firm place from which we can assess
its validity. The theory derives much of its power from the assertion that
people do not have unitary or consistent preferences. They are torn be-
tween contradictory universalist and particularist urges, and their choices
between conflicting options are irreducibly context dependent.'"4 But if
183. See supra Section I.A.
184. See supra Section I.C.1.
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this is true, then there is no reason to suppose that we will be able to
transcend context in evaluating the theory or the institutions that the the-
ory purports to justify. The theory can thus be turned on itself and used
to deny the very possibility of this, or any other, constitutional theory.
We can begin to explore these difficulties by contrasting universalist
and particularist critiques of the theory. Some critics who are attracted to
universalist values might argue that the last thing we need at this stage of
our political development is a theory justifying legal restraints on govern-
ment intervention in the private sphere. In this age of deregulation, wide-
spread disenchantment with big government, and growing inequalities in
wealth and power in the private sphere, these critics might contend there
is little danger that our political institutions will not take sufficient ac-
count of particularist values. On the contrary, universalist concerns are
everywhere in retreat.
In some measure this criticism rests on a failure to understand that the
boundary maintenance theory has two component parts which must be
considered together. It may be true that our present government poses no
serious threat to particularist values. But that is precisely because our pre-
sent government is insufficiently universalist in orientation. The theory
insists that, faced with such a government, judicial review should be used
to push representative institutions toward universalism and that if it suc-
ceeded in this endeavor, then a fully universalist government would pose a
threat to particularist values.
This response does not fully answer universalist critics of the theory. A
universalist might respond by reintroducing the question of context. It
may be true that in some hypothetical context where government func-
tioned very differently, there would be a need to check its invasion of the
private sphere. In actuality, we require a theory of constitutional law for
our own time; currently, a theory that provides rhetorical support for
those defending vast accumulations of private power and wealth is likely
to produce nothing but mischief.
Ironically, while not satisfying critics with a universalist bias, the the-
ory is also likely to be equally unsatisfactory to those attracted to particu-
larist values. Once again, the difficulty relates to context and to shortcom-
ings inherent in efforts to manipulate context. Specifically, to preserve
particularist values in uncorrupted form, the theory requires at crucial
points an extremely fragile precommitment to self-deception. As noted
above, 185 a precommitment to deprive government of power over "private"
decisionmaking is necessary, since otherwise a fully universalist govern-
ment would be forced to advance universalist justifications for allowing
185. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
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particularist decisions, thereby destroying their particularist character.
There was a time when this disempowerment was accomplished by a
world view that treated certain questions as "inherently" or "naturally"
private and, therefore, immune from government interference. Although
remnants of this approach survive, our ability to fool ourselves with it was
severely damaged by the New Deal and the destruction of the old natural
law limitations on government power that came in its wake.
In some measure, we have replaced this technique with a precommit-
ment to secrecy in the particularist sphere." 6 If the government does not
"know" what is going on, then it need not provide a universalist justifica-
tion for it. Unfortunately, this form of self-deception is extremely fragile.
It is not clear that self-deception in this sense-deciding not to know what
we, in fact, do know-is ever a coherent strategy. Moreover, even if we
could succeed in deliberately forgetting what is happening in the particu-
larist sphere, government must still establish the institutions that cause it
to forget. A fully universalist government would need to offer universalist
justifications for these institutions, thereby corrupting particularist values
once again, this time at one step removed."8 "
Moreover, it is not clear that we can deliberately forget, or that, even if
we could, we would want to develop this capacity for deliberate self-
deception. No amount of secrecy surrounding particularist decisions can
erase the nagging reality that those decisions are taking place and that
government could do something about them. The boundary between pub-
lic and private is thus constantly threatened by those who refuse to play
the game, who stubbornly insist on making us see the suffering on the
other side of the wall we have erected. Breaching the wall of self-
deception vastly increases the risk of corrupting particularist choices by
making their legitimacy contingent upon the availability of universalist
justifications for them.
In fact, evidence of such corruption is all around us. For example, the
Court has endorsed public accommodation of private religious faith. Be-
cause the accommodation must be defended in a public forum, the Court
has felt compelled to make universalist arguments for its position, argu-
ments that tend to destroy the very values being accommodated. Thus,
deeply religious symbols like the creche become, for the Court, merely a
portion of a display with plastic reindeer, exhibited to advance universal-
186. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
187. This difficulty is part of a larger problem posed by all precommitment strategies. These
strategies are premised on a meta-choice to privilege choices made in one context over those made in
another. But since the meta-choice itself must be made in some context, it is unclear why it should
enjoy privileged status. See ULysss, supra note 74, at 41-42. Thus, even when we act in advance to
establish a public or private context for decisionmaking, we must necessarily be acting in a public or
private context, and that context itself will bias our decision regarding the choice of context.
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ist, secular objectives.188 Similarly, the Court's public recognition of the
need for an autonomous sphere for private family decisionmaking has, on
occasion, resulted in a fundamental recharacterization of the family. A
public defense of the family transforms that institution from a means of
nurturing love and special relationships for their own sake into a utility
maximizing method for controlling socially harmful deviant behavior."8 9
Thus, the boundary maintenance theory arguably gives us the worst of
both worlds. By defending the integrity of a private sphere, it may ob-
struct desirable universalist restraints on the exercise of private power.
Yet by relying upon a vulnerable precommitment to self-deception, it may
also corrupt the very particularist values it purports to defend.
Ultimately, what is most troubling about the theory is not that it is
subject to these particularist and universalist critiques, but that it denies
the possibility of any normative judgments about itself. Both the particu-
larist and the universalist critiques begin with an assumption about the
orientation of the critic. If the theory is correct, however, all critics who
are whole persons are necessarily both particularist and universalist in
orientation, with their preferences dependent on context. The plausibility
of the critiques, as well as of the theory itself, thus turns on a different
self-deception-the belief that the authorial voice advancing the theory
188. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The need to advance secular arguments for a
municipality's inclusion of a cr&he in a public Christmas display on the one hand, without debasing
its religious significance on the other, led the Lynch Court into predictable contradiction. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Burger rejected the trial court's finding that the inclusion of the criche had
no secular purpose and constituted "some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular reli-
gious message." Id. at 680. But unambiguous reliance on the putative secular purposes of the display
would rob the cr&he of its religious significance, thereby destroying the very religious values the
Court sought to accommodate. Therefore, while rejecting the possibility that the crache served reli-
gious purposes, the Chief Justice also felt compelled to disassociate himself from the view that it
served no religious purposes: "INIone who sense the origins of the Christmas celebration would fail to
be aware of [the display's] religious implications. That the display brings people into the central city,
and serves commercial interests and benefits merchants and their employees, does not . . . determine
the character of the display." Id. at 685.
189. As Professor Burt has forcefully argued, this is the only way to reconcile the Court's other-
wise contradictory treatment of issues of parental control in cases such as Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979), and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See Burt, supra note 157, at 332-45. In
Parham, the Court refused to accord full-scale hearings to children whose parents wished to confine
them to mental institutions. Although acknowledging the liberty interest in avoiding unjustified hospi-
talization, the Court rejected "[tihe statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children .... " 442 U.S. at 603 (em-
phasis in original). Yet in Ingraham, the Court approved the use of corporal punishment in the
schools even in the face of parental objections:
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the parents, the
concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the view . . . that the State itself may
impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary "for the proper education of the
child and for the maintenance of group discipline."
430 U.S. at 662 (citation and footnote omitted). As Professor Burt writes, the principle underlying
these and other cases is "not that parental authority as such warrants respect. Rather, the authority
over children that commands constitutionally mandated respect is that which is backed by force clearly
promising effective control over children's disruptive impulses." Burt, supra note 157, at 338.
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and its possible criticisms is "neutral," disembodied, and context-less. The
anonymous, grey prose of law journal writing promotes this illusion. It is,
of course, an illusion. Law journal writing (and reading)-like voting,
constitution writing, or family conversation-is itself a context that, if the
theory is correct, influences choice. And there is no more reason to privi-
lege this context than any other.
I have no desire to minimize or explain away these difficulties. None-
theless, it would be unfair to suppose that these are problems that
uniquely afflict a boundary maintenance approach. They are the difficul-
ties faced by any post-Realist constitutional theory. Recall, for example,
that the Carolene Products compromise ultimately collapsed because Le-
gal Realism left us similarly skeptical of our ability to articulate any "nat-
ural," "principled," or disembodied division between public and private.
In a world without Lochner, all constitutional theories-including the
skeptical theory propounded by Justice Holmes himself-must contend
with the corrosive force of the skepticism that Holmes bequeathed to us.
It is worth emphasizing, therefore, that as long as the Lochner ap-
proach remains implausible, the real competitor to boundary maintenance
is not another legitimating theory. The serious challenge comes from those
who reject theory altogether and would have us embrace nihilism. It
would surely be wrong to dismiss such an approach out of hand. There is
an undeniable attraction to the idea of simply "doing" constitutional law
without bothering with justifying theory.
Using such an approach, we might opt for a model that made no effort
to specify in advance either the boundaries between a public and a private
sphere or an agreed-upon method for establishing the boundaries. Instead,
we could simply allow unrestrained warfare between public and private.
The corruption of public and private values might be avoided if we
stopped trying to accommodate public and private spheres.190 For exam-
ple, private religious values would no longer be debased if the state simply
punished religious dissenters without attempting public toleration of pri-
vate values. Public punishment takes private values seriously by acknowl-
edging, in a way that toleration does not, the ultimate irreconcilability of
public and private choices.191 Similarly, a model based on conflict rather
190. The Court may in fact have already stopped trying in some cases. See Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67-68 (1983).
191. Dean Ely has made an analogous point with regard to certain forms of political protest
which would lose their meaning if they were tolerated. "Had there been no law prohibiting draft card
burning. . . [a protester] might have attracted no more attention than he would have by swallowing a
goldfish." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1489-90 (1975). Dean Ely's observation puts a
somewhat sinister cast on Justice Brandeis' famous defense of the First Amendment on the ground
that repression "menaces stable government." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7
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than accommodation might better advance public universalist values. It
may be a mistake to suppose that any tinkering with the constitutional
balance between government and nongovernmental spheres will make our
society appreciably more egalitarian. Conceivably, governmental institu-
tions freed of constitutional constraints might adopt a program of redistri-
bution. But this remains unlikely because the very private power we
would wish to control would result in unequal access to political institu-
tions, access that can be utilized to stymie any redistributive program. 92
Thus, it is at least possible that if serious redistribution is ever achieved in
the United States, it will not be because people accept inherited social
arrangements as embodied in existing constitutional doctrine or theory,
but because people are willing and able to overthrow those arrange-
ments.1 98
It follows that both universalists and particularists might well prefer
conflict to accommodation, and would think it foolish to look to any con-
stitutional theory to satisfy their objectives. But the rub is that Legal Re-
alism deprives us not only of a theory, but also of the possibility of doing
without a theory. The lesson of Miller v. Schoene194 is that all ac-
tions-and all inactions-have consequences, and that there is no refuge
from the obligation to choose. Thus, even if it were true that unrestricted
conflict between public and private would produce "desirable" outcomes,
one needs some sort of theory to explain why those outcomes, as opposed
to others we could also choose, are in fact desirable. The very effort to
defend an atheoretical stance forces us once again into normative judg-
ments which call out for a theoretical defense. Nihilism, too, is a theory
that can be turned against itself.
We are left, then, with a final layer of self-deception. We know in some
sense that we can never transcend context and that theory is therefore
impossible. (And I don't need to be reminded, thank you, that the state-
ment that all statements are context bound is, itself, a context bound state-
ment.) But we must either act or fail to act, and either course requires
(1970) ("Freedom of expression ... provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the
progress of a society can take place without destroying the society."). There is an extensive literature
on the "repressive" uses of toleration. See, e.g., Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF
PURE TOLERANCE 95-109 (R. Wolff, B. Moore, Jr. & H. Marcuse eds. 1969).
192. For a good discussion of how deep these difficulties run, and why they are likely to resist
reformist solutions, see Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?,
83 MiCH. L. REv. 939 (1985).
193. My colleague, Mark Tushnet, has put the point this way:
[Tihe Stalinism trap asks why a moderately risk-averse person. . . should try to alter the way
things are. The answer is clear: conditions of life overall are so near the floor that the cost of
falling to the bottom discounted by the likelihood of such a disaster is more than offset by the
benefits of alternative forms of social life discounted by the likelihood of their realization.
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1402 (1984).
194. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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justification. So in order to live our lives, there is no escape from telling
ourselves that we are able to transcend context so as to make decisions
about the kind of future we want to have.195
That is why people are likely to go on thinking about constitutional
theory. And that is why those who think about it seriously are likely to
remain uneasy.
195. As Thomas Nagel has written:
It is necessary to combine the recognition of our contingency, and our containment in the
world with an ambition of transcendence, however limited may be our success in achieving it.
The right attitude . . . is to accept aims that we can achieve only fractionally and imperfectly,
and cannot be sure of achieving even to that extent.
T. NAGC,,., THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 9 (1986).
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